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Over the decades, the courts have released accused persons on bail 
pending the outcome of their criminal trial.  The Criminal Procedure 
Act 51 of 1977 (CPA) regulates the process in criminal courts and 
also deals with the arrest and detention of accused persons.  This Act 
states that a person, following his arrest, may be detained for a 
period prior to his first appearance in a lower court1.   
 
During the 1980’s2, the Supreme Court of South Africa interpreted 
these sections to such an extent that it allowed the accused to apply 
for bail during this period of detention preceding his or her first 
appearance in court.  This was also confirmed by the Appeal Court in 
the 1990’s3, which was, at that stage, the highest court in South 
Africa.  Accused persons were permitted to apply for bail outside 
normal court hours and on weekends.   
 
After the release of former President Nelson Mandela and once our 
country had become a democracy, South Africa adopted a 
Constitution and Bill of Rights which entrenched the fundamental 
rights of an accused person.  One of the primary rights established in 
these texts was the right of an accused person to be released on bail 
as soon as reasonably possible4.  
 
At the time of this new dispensation, the courts in South Africa 
acknowledged the rights that had been granted to accused persons 
under the “Old Regime”.  From 1993 to 1996, when the Interim 
Constitution came into being, accused persons were allowed to apply 
for bail outside normal court hours.  During 1996, the Final 
Constitution of South Africa was adopted, and the law pertaining to 
after hour bail applications remained the same as it had been since 
1986. 
                                                     
1 Section 50(1)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Act (CPA) reads “he or she shall be 
brought before a lower court as soon as reasonably possible but not later than 48 
hours after his arrest.” 
2 Twayie v Minister van Justisie 1986 (2) SA 101(O);  S v Du Preez 1991 (2) SACR 
372 (Ck). 
3 Minister van Wet en Order v Dipper 1993 (2) SACR 221 (A). 
4 Section 25(2)(b) of the Interim Constitution Act 2000 of 1993.  Section 35(1)(f) of 






Unfortunately, the law was amended on 1 August 19985. 
 
Since the adoption of this amendment to the law, accused persons 
are only allowed to apply for bail outside of normal court hours for 
lesser offences6, and are not entitled to approach a court of law to 
adjudicate bail applications outside of normal court hours7.  The 
situation is currently that prosecutors8 and police officials9 preside 
over bail applications and an accused person has no recourse should 
the application be disputed. 
 
The right to bail was further hindered with the inclusion of sections 
in the CPA which allow the prosecutor to adjourn a matter for up to 
seven days at the first appearance in a lower court10, not taking into 
account the time spent incarcerated after the arrest.   
 
The rights that were granted to accused persons by the common law, 
which were recognised through the Supreme Court and Appeal Court 
decisions over the years, and which were reflected in the Interim and 
Final Constitutions, have been summarily confiscated by the 
amendment of the CPA which is unconstitutional and demands 
scrutiny, or even revision.  
 





                                                     
5 The Criminal Procedure Second Amendment Act 85 of 1997 came into operation 
on the 1st of August 1998. 
6 Section 59A of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
7 Section 50(6)(b) of Act 51 of 1977. 
8 Section 59A of Act 51 of 1977. 
9 Section 59 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 





2. THE ORIGINS OF THE RIGHT TO BAIL 
The development of bail proceedings and the right to bail also entail 
the development of the common law pertaining to bail.  The common 
law plays an important role in the Constitutional interpretation of 
statutes and the Bill of Rights.  The Bill of Rights acknowledges rights 
and freedoms that are conferred by common law11 and the 




The right to apply for bail originates in England.  The procedure of 
granting bail to an accused in a criminal case can be traced back to 
673 AD13.   
 
During the rule of the English kings Hokhaere and Eucric, an 
accused was required to deposit a sum of money (borh).  The 
accused was then released on condition that he or she return to 
stand his or her trial.  Only then was the bail money refunded to the 
depositor upon the acquittal of the accused.14
 
During the early Norman period, sheriffs were given the discretion to 
release an accused on pledging of security15.  This practice became 
the norm during this period, even for offences as heinous as 
homicide.   
 
Bail proceedings gradually changed and the bail granting function 
was largely transferred to justices of the peace.  The justices of peace 
were creatures of statute16. 
 
During the 17th century and onwards, various statutes were enacted, 
regulating bail pertaining to a variety of specific offences17.   
                                                     
11 Section 39(3) of the Constitution Act 108 of 1996. 
12 Section 173 of the Constitution Act 108 of 1996. 
13 J van der Berg Bail: A Practitioner’s Guide 2 ed (2001) at 2. 
14 Ibid. 
15 N Corre & S D Wolchover Bail in Criminal Proceedings (1999) at 11. 
16 Ibid at 14. 





The right to be granted bail pending the outcome of a trial was well 
entrenched in the English law.  The right to liberty of a person was 
protected by statute.   
 
The refusal or delay by any judge or magistrate to grant bail to any 
person entitled to be bailed was not seen as a trifle.  It constituted a 
violation of the Habeas Corpus Act 1679 and of the Bill of Rights 
1688 and was also a common law offence against the liberty of the 
subject18. 
 
During the 19th century the power to grant bail became a judicial 
function.  As it was not ministerial or administrative, no action could 
be brought against a magistrate if bail was refused.  Action could 
only be taken against the magistrate with proof of malice on the side 
of the magistrate during the decision-making process19. 
 
However Lord Runel in R v Rose20 remarked and said: 
 
“It cannot be too strongly impressed on the magistracy that bail 
is not to be withheld as a punishment.  Since this is a truism 
which needs no expressing, it can hardly be imagined that it 
would be malicious for any magistrate or judge to deny bail out 
of such a motive.” 
 
During the mid 1800’s, the Indictable Offences Act 1848 came into 
operation and remained in force until the 20th century.  Section 23 of 
this Act gave the presiding justice an unfettered discretion to grant or 
refuse bail of any offence. 
 
The history of bail in England needs no further explanation in respect 
of its relevance to South African law.  During the 1800’s, Britain 
invaded South Africa, South Africa became a British colony and 
English procedural law became part of South African law21. 
                                                     
18 N Corre & S D Wolchover Bail in Criminal Proceedings (1999) at 11. 
19 Ibid. 
20 (1898) 78 LT119. 





Although the South African common law is based on the Roman-
Dutch law, no mention is made therein to the procedure of bail in a 
criminal trial. 
 
It has been argued22 that: 
 
“perhaps surprising that the concept of bail did not suggest 
itself to early Roman-Dutch lawyers nor, for that matter, to the 
Romans, for the idea of blood money (palisi de taliene 
redimenda) to exclude the application of talio or retaliation in 
kind was already established in the Twelve Tables.” 
 
With the British rule of the Cape, the right to bail pending the 
outcome of a criminal trial was transplanted to South African 
criminal procedures23. 
 
(ii) South Africa 
The right to bail in South Africa can be traced as far back as 1828.  
Ordinance 40 of 1828 (Cape) made provision for bail pending the 
outcome of a criminal trial.  The Boer Republics adopted similar 
provisions to grant bail to awaiting-trial prisoners24. 
 
The Criminal Procedure Code Ordinance 1 of 1903 (Transvaal) dealt 
with the release of an arrested person on bail. 
 
Section 97 reads: 
 
“Every prisoner committed for trial in respect of any offence 
except treason or murder is entitled as soon as the warrant of 




                                                     
22 J van der Berg Bail: A Practitioner’s Guide 2 ed (2001) at 2. 
23 Ibid, Ordinance 40 of 1828 (Cape). 






Section 98 reads: 
 
“It shall be competent for the prisoner at the time of the 
commitment to apply verbally to the magistrate or judge 
granting the warrant of commitment to be immediately 
liberated on bail.” 
 
Section 101 grants the Supreme Court jurisdiction to grant bail at 
any stage of the proceedings for any offence.  Section 101 reads, “the 
Supreme Court has power at any stage of the proceedings to admit to 
bail in all cases whatever, whether capital or not.”25
 
It is evident from these sections that parliament acknowledged that 
every person has the right to apply for bail when indicted for a 
criminal offence. 
 
It is my understanding that this right to bail could have been 
exercised immediately after the warrant for commitment was made 
out.  The phrases in sections 97 and 98 “entitled as soon as” and 
“immediately liberated on bail” indicate that this right was not 
suspended.  The prosecution was not, in terms of this ordinance, 
entitled to an adjournment to prepare for the bail applications. 
 
In addition to the right to bring a bail application, parliament 
acknowledged the urgency of bail applications.  Section 100 reads: 
 
“Every magistrate to whom an application for bail is made shall 
within twenty four hours after such application of the offence 
bailable by him fix the amount of bail to be given and failing to 
do so shall be liable in the penalty of a sum not exceeding one 
hundred pounds.”26
 
                                                     






The Ordinance 1 of 1903 (Transvaal) was used as a model for the 
Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act 31 of 1917.  Chapter 8 of this 
act dealt with the bail after preparatory examination is concluded. 
Section 99 of this act was a reproduction of section 97 of Ordinance 1 
of 1903, except that rape was included as a non-bailable offence.  It 
appears from the Act that any person could apply for bail for any 
offence, however in terms of section 109 of Act 31 of 1917, only a 
Superior Court, not a Magistrate, could grant bail for the non-
bailable offences.   
 
This section reads: 
 
“A superior court having jurisdiction in respect of an offence 
has power at any stage of any proceedings taken in any court 
or before any magistrate in respect of that offence, to admit the 
accused to bail, whether the offence is or is not one of the 
offences specifically excepted in section ninety-nine.” 
 
This act was later repealed by the Criminal Procedure Act 56 of 1955, 
and the Act currently dealing with bail pending the outcome of a 
criminal trial is chapter 9 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
 
The Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (CPA) came into effect prior to 
the constitution of South Africa.  During the last decade, bail 
applications and the rules that govern them became more and more 
complex. 
Krigler J noted: 
 
“The origins of bail are obscured in the mists of Anglo-Saxon 
history, and its modern dimensions remain an incoherent 
amalgam of old and new ideas, serving to defeat than to achieve 
the aims of criminal process.  In South Africa, judicial 
pronouncements on the topic have been called labyrinthine.  
There is a murkiness even at the elemental level of the 
source(s) of South African judicial power to grant bail, ie 





circumscribed by – chapter 9 of the CPA or whether there is a 
parallel reservoir of “inherent” or “common law” power on 
which a judge can draw.” 27
 
During the pre-Constitution era, the bail proceedings were primarily 
governed by the provisions of the CPA.  During the post-apartheid 
years, South Africa gained a Constitution which provides the 
“principal template against which chapter 9 of the CPA must be 
measured.”28
 
~ * ~ 
                                                     
27 S v Dlamini and others 1999 (2) SACR 51 (CC) at 57 para 3. 





3. CHAPTER 9 OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
ACT 51 OF 1977 
Chapter 9 of the CPA deals with bail proceedings.  This chapter has 
undergone far-reaching changes in the last two decades which have 
impacted on an accused’s right to bail, and more particularly the 
right to apply for bail outside normal court hours and on an urgent 
basis.   
 
To illustrate this, one must differentiate between the wording of 
certain sections of chapter 9 before 1 August 1998 and the current 
wording of these sections. 
 
I distinguish the two stages of incarceration of an accused person 
and the right to bring a bail application during these periods: 
 
1. The FIRST STAGE is from the time of arrest until the time 
the accused appears in the lower court; 
 
2. The SECOND STAGE is from the time the accused appears 
in the lower court until such time that the matter is 
finalised. 
 
3.1 Chapter 9 before 1 August 1998 
Before 1 August 1998, bail applications were governed by section 60 
of the CPA which read: 
 
“An accused who is in custody in respect of any offence may at 
his first appearance in a lower court or at any stage after such 
appearance, apply to such court or, if the proceedings against 
the accused are pending in a superior court, to that court, to 
be released on bail in respect of such offence.” 
 
Section 59 of the CPA also authorises police officials with the rank 
above non-commissioned officers to grant bail for less serious 






“1(a) An accused who is in custody in respect of any offence, 
other than an offence referred to in Part II or Part III of 
Schedule 2 may, before his first appearance in a lower 
court, be released on bail in respect of such offence by a 
police official of or above the rank of non-commissioned 
officer.” 
 
Sections 59 and 60 dealt with the procedure of applying for bail.  
These two sections must be read together to fully understand the 
procedure of applying for bail before 1998.  With regard to the 
discussion above, one must apply these two sections to the two 
stages before and after the first appearance of an accused in court. 
 
As previously mentioned, the first stage is from arrest until first 
appearance in a court and the second stage from first appearance 
until the finalisation of the case. 
 
3.1(a) First Stage 
When a person is arrested by the police, the provisions of section 50 
of the CPA apply to the detainee. 
 
This section allows the police to detain a person for forty-eight hours 
from the time of arrest until his or her first appearance.  When the 
provisions of this section are applied literally, it can become nearly a 
week in some instances before an accused is brought to court. 
 
Section 50(1) reads: 
 
“Provided that if the period of forty-eight hours expires: 
 
(a) on a day which is not a court day or on any court 
day after four o’clock in the afternoon, the said 
period shall be deemed to expire at four o’clock the 






(b) On any court day before four o’clock in the 
afternoon, the said period shall be deemed to 
expire at four o’clock in the afternoon of such court 
day. 
 
(c) At the time when the arrested person is outside the 
area of jurisdiction of the lower court to which he 
is being brought…the said period shall be deemed 
to expire at four o’clock in the afternoon of the 
court day next succeeding the day on which such 
person is brought within the area of jurisdiction of 
such court.” 
 
Without further discussion of all the subsections of section 50 of the 
CPA, it is clear that if the forty-eight hour rule is applied to the letter 
of the word it is open for abuse by the police.   
 
If a person is arrested on a Monday in Johannesburg and is brought 
down to Cape Town and the time of arrival is past four o’clock on the 
Wednesday, the forty-eight hours will only lapse at four o’clock the 
subsequent Monday afternoon. 
 
It is evident that a person whose liberty was taken away must be able 
to bring a bail application. 
 
It is very important to understand that these bail applications are 
urgent applications. The right to bail will be invalidated if the 
application cannot be heard. 
 
Bail applications were heard at any hour of the day during the first 
stage of detention pre-1998. 
 
In dealing with bail applications, the court, in Hurley v Minister of 
Law and Order29, stated “the matter is one of the utmost urgency as 
it concerns the liberty of the subject.” 
                                                     






The Supreme Court of Appeal reiterated this position recently, saying, 
“It is evident that the finalising of an application for bail is always a 
matter or urgency.”30
 
When a detained person wished to bring a bail application under the 
pre-1998 CPA, he could apply to the police officer for bail 
immediately.  The police officer could then have dealt with the 
application in the following manner: 
 
(a) The officer could set bail in an amount if it falls within his 
jurisdiction to set bail; or 
 
(b) The officer could indicate that the nature of the offence falls 
outside of his jurisdiction in terms of section 59 of the CPA; 
or 
 
(c) Although the offence falls within his jurisdiction to grant 
bail, he could refuse to do so or indicate to the applicant 
that he is opposed to bail. 
 
If bail was granted as stated in (a), the problem was resolved and 
needed no further discussion.  Should the position be as set out in (b) 
or (c) above, the accused could have approached a magistrate to 
grant bail. 
 
The Supreme Court, as it was then known, ruled in more than one 
instance that an accused had the right to bring a bail application as a 
matter of urgency, even outside normal court hours31. 
 
The first decision from the Supreme Court with regard to the urgency 
of bail applications and the right to bring a bail application before the 
first appearance in a lower court was in Twayie en ‘n Ander v Minister 
van Justisie.32
                                                     
30 Magistrate Stutterheim v Mashinga 2004 (5) SA 209 (SCA) at 215 para [16]. 






In this matter, the accused wanted to bring a bail application after 
the arrest.  The police had no objection to the granting of bail and 
were even prepared to release the accused on bail.  The police officer 
to whom the matter was assigned could not set bail33.   
 
The Applicant approached the local magistrate to set bail, however he 
was informed by the Chief Magistrate that the application could not 
be heard.  The magistrate’s reasons were: 
 
(i) that the application is “onwettig” (illegal); and 
(ii) that the court may not hear the application after hours. 
 
The Applicant then approached the Supreme Court (High Court) with 
an urgent application seeking an order to be released on bail.  In 
terms of s 60 of the CPA, the court ruled that: 
 
‘“at his first appearance in a lower court … apply to such court 
… to be released on bail’.  The words “first appearance” are not 
indicative of an intention on the part of the Legislature that 
voluntary applications for bail may not be brought before the 
compulsory first appearance in the lower court or of an 
intention to circumscribe the court’s powers.  The words, 
therefore, do not only apply to the first compulsory appearance 
in terms of s 50 of the Act but include the first appearance at 
the request of the accused.  A lower court is consequently 
                                                     
33 This was due to the provisions of s 59 of the CPA.  The section allows any police 
official of or above the rank of non-commissioned officer to set bail after hours.  
Section 59(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 reads “…any offence, 
other than an offence referred to in part II or part III of Schedule 2…”  PART II 
reads, “Treason, sedition, murder, rape, robbery, assault, breaking or entering any 
premises…, theft…if the value involved in the offence exceeds R2500.  Any 
offence…relating to illicit dealing in or possession of precious metals or…stones, 
any offence under any law relating to the-(a) possession of - (i) dagga exceeding 115 
grams; or (ii) any other dependence-producing drugs, (b) conveyance or supply of 
dependence-producing drugs.  Any offence relating to the coinage, any conspiracy, 
incitement or attempt to commit any offence referred to in this part.”  PART II also 
includes contravening of the provisions of sections 1 and 1A of the Intimidation Act 





competent, as well as obliged, to hear and decide bail 
applications outside normal hours on non-court days.”34
 
It is very important to bear in mind that at the time of this ruling, 
parliamentary sovereignty prevailed and the courts could not rule on 
the constitutionality of any statutory provisions. 
 
This judgement paved the way for the right to bail after hours.  This 
right was also given to every citizen of South Africa.  This judgement 
must have been music to the ears of every human rights lawyer, 
especially as it was given in the dark days of apartheid.   
 
The court ruled, “Elke verhoorafwagtende is ŉ potensiële onskuldige 
en onnodige inperking van die burger se vryheid druis teen alle 
beskaafde regsgevoel in.”35
 
This is the correct approach to any bail application.  If it is accepted 
that an accused is presumed to be innocent, it becomes important 
that the person’s right to liberty is respected and consequently their 
right to apply for bail.   
 
It is also not only the duty of the court to respect a citizen’s right to 
freedom and the right to bring a bail application; it is also the duty of 
the State and the State’s machinery.36
 
On a daily basis, the police receive complaints about crimes and 
persons get investigated.  The police then contact the suspect to 
report to the police station.  The suspect should then, with or without 
legal representation, report to the police station or Investigating 
Officer.  If an arrest follows, one would assume that the police would 
assist the accused in bringing a bail application or at least take the 
accused to court as soon as possible. 
 
                                                     
34 Twayie v Minister van Justisie 1986 (2) SA 101 (O) at 101H-I. 
35 Supra at 104E. 





Sadly history and case law have taught us that from time to time 
members of the South African Police Services have unlawfully delayed 
bail applications37.  This abuse of power frustrates a person’s right to 
bring a bail application. 
 
Without overemphasising the point, it must be understood that as 
soon as a person is arrested, he must be entitled to bring a bail 
application on an urgent basis.  In addition to this right, he should be 
assisted by the State (the police, the prosecutor and court personnel) 
to be heard by a magistrate.  It cannot be expected of an accused or 
his attorney to negotiate his release with the police or the prosecutor 
for the State. 
 
Should the prosecutor or police be unable to agree to an amount of 
bail, the accused should immediately be brought before a court to 
argue his release. 
 
Although it will be addressed more fully hereunder, it must be 
stressed that the right to bail has little value if an accused does not 
have the right to bring a bail application38. 
 
In addition to these issues, the applicant should be assisted by the 
State in bringing the application39. 
 
The facts in S v du Preez40 are a classic example of the difficulties 
with which accused persons and attorneys have to deal in criminal 
matters.  The accused was sought in a criminal investigation of stock 
theft. 
 
                                                     
37 S v du Preez 1991 (2) SACR 372 (Ck); Novick v Minister of Law and Order and 
Another 1993 (1) SACR 194 (W); Die Burger of Monday 27 June 2005: 
“JOHANNESBURG – Die dae is getel dat polisiebeamptes verdagtes “moedswillig” op 
Donderdae of Vrydae in hegtenis neem sodat die verdagtes vier dae pleks van die 
wetlike voorgeskrewe twee dae in aanhouding moet bly. [‘n] situasie wat dekades al 
grimmigheid onder die publiek en regslui veroorsaak, …” 
38 S v du Preez 1991 (2) SACR 372 (Ck) at 378a-b. 






The attorney for the accused contacted the prosecutor for the State 
and a senior police officer confirming that the accused would report 
to the police on his own accord.  The police once again, before the 
accused reported, reassured the suspect that the purpose for his 
reporting was to make a statement only.  On his arrival, the suspect 
was arrested. 
 
The attorney immediately arranged for a bail application and the 
prosecutor informed the attorney that bail would not be opposed.  For 
the first and the second day after the arrest the police manoeuvred, 
not bringing the accused to court.   
 
Thereafter the accused brought an application and the Supreme 
Court requisitioned the court to release him. 
 
Three of the issues the court considered were41: 
 
“A The effect of the provisions of s 50 of Act 51 of 1977 and 
the question whether police are entitled and obliged to 
detain a person that has been arrested for at least 48 
hours. 
 
B The question whether a person who has been arrested is 
entitled to apply for bail after his arrest and before the 
aforesaid 48 hours have lapsed. 
 
C Whether a police officer is entitled to refuse or fail to 
make a person in custody available to attend court for an 
application for bail and the effect thereof should he 
refuse and/or fail to do so.” 
 
On question A, the court ruled: 
 
“It is clear from the provisions of s 50(1) that an arrested 
person can be detained, but that he may not be detained for a 
                                                     





period longer than 48 hours… There is no indication that the 
police are obliged to detain such an arrested person for at least 
48 hours.”42
 
With regards to questions B and C above, the court ruled: 
 
“The effect of this is that a person who is in custody and before 
expiry of the 48 hour period as envisaged by s 50 is entitled, on 
his own initiative, to arrange ‘a first appearance’ in court in 
order to bring a bail application…  A magistrate and prosecutor 
would, therefore, also be obliged to arrange for a bail 
application to be heard outside normal court hours…  Police 
officers are in fact part of the legal machinery and will, 
therefore, also be obliged to co-operate and make themselves 
available in order to make it possible for a court to entertain a 
bail application.”43
 
This judgement empowered an accused with certain rights that are of 
paramount importance to the criminal justice system in any country. 
 
These rights are: 
 
(i) The right to be released on bail pending the outcome of a 
criminal case; 
 
(ii) The right to be heard by a court as soon as possible, even 
before the lapse of the 48 hours after arrest; and 
 
(iii) The right to be assisted by the State machinery to bring the 
application notwithstanding the State’s view relating to the 
release of the accused on bail. 
 
                                                     
42 S v Du Preez 1991 (2) SACR 372 (Ck) at 376c. 





One must accept that this view held by the court is correct, however 
it is disturbing that it is not the norm in the post-apartheid 
constitutional era in South Africa.  It will be more fully discussed in 
the comparison with the post-1998 position pertaining to the right to 
bail in South Africa. 
 
The rights mentioned above were confirmed by the Supreme Court in 
Novick v Minister of Law and Order and Another.44
 
The facts in this matter are similar to those in S v Du Preez45; once 
again the suspect was requested to report to the South African Police 
and the suspect reported to the notorious Brixton Murder and 
Robbery unit with his attorney.  In this instance the suspect and his 
legal advisor expected that an arrest may follow on arrival at this unit 
of the police.  Nonetheless the suspect reported to the police as 
undertaken by his legal advisor.  This behaviour indicates that the 
suspect had no intention not to stand his trial. 
 
The arrest followed and the legal representative requested the 
opportunity to bring a bail application.  As this person was still a 
candidate attorney, he requested to contact an attorney to arrange for 
an urgent bail application.  The use of a telephone was refused, and 
other arrangements were made by the candidate attorney to contact 
an attorney.   
 
On return, the accused and the policeman had disappeared.  It later 
appeared that the police had deliberately hidden the accused. 
 
The attorneys for Dos Santos, the accused, tried for two days to bring 
a bail application for him.  The response from the Investigating 
Officer was, “Ek ontken dat toegang tot ‘n borgaansoek geweier is op 
enige stadium.  Sodanige aansoek moes net inpas binne die 
raamwerk van my ondersoek.”46   
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The Supreme Court was once again approached and reconfirmed the 
principles as set out in Twayie v Minister of Justice47 and S v Du 
Preez48 namely the right of an accused to bring a bail application 
within the 48 hours as envisaged in s 50 of the CPA.  The court also 
placed a duty on the State to co-operate and to make it possible for a 
bail application to take place.49
 
The court went further and gave the accused the right to be heard by 
a court and disallowed the police (State) to be the arbiter as to 
whether the accused was entitled to bail or not.  Burman AJ ruled, 
“leave it to the court to consider whether the accused is entitled to 
bail.” 50
 
This right has been limited to a great extent as a consequence of the 
post 1998 amendment to the CPA, which will be discussed more 
critically later. 
 
During the first stage of detention pre-1998, an accused person had 
certain rights to bail.  These rights were: 
 
(i) to be brought to court before the expiry of the 48 hours 
referred to in s 50 of the CPA; 
 
(ii) to bring a bail application during the 48 hour period with the 
assistance of the State; 
 
(iii) to be released on bail should the court deem it fit; 
 
(iv) to have the court decide over the release on bail and not for 
the State to be the arbiter regarding the release; and 
 
(v) to bring a bail application for any offence after hours before 
a magistrate. 
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3.1(b) Second Stage 
The second stage in which an accused may apply for bail is from the 
first appearance as envisaged in s 60 of the CPA until the criminal 
case is finalised.   
 
The principles as set out in the Twayie case also apply to the second 
stage.51  All the rights granted to an accused at his or her “first 
appearance” during the first stage remained the same during the 
“first appearance’ at the second stage. 
 
The issue pertaining to the right to bail becomes a more practical 
issue.  If the wish of the accused was to bring an urgent bail 
application, he was entitled to do so after the arrest.  If he did not 
bring a bail application, he had the right to apply for bail at his first 
appearance.  Section 60 of the CPA reads, “An accused who is in 
custody in respect of any offence may…at any stage after such 
appearance apply to such court…to be released on bail.” 
 
It becomes more of a practical issue when the accused elects not to 
bring a bail application, and after the adjournment and in prison he 
decides to bring a bail application.   
 
Should an accused decide to bring a bail application, one cannot 
expect that it should be heard after hours or on weekends.  However, 
if the accused wants to bring a bail application, he can be 
requisitioned to appear on the same or next court day as there is no 
longer a 48 hour rule. 
 
When the accused appears in court after the requisition and the bail 
application commences, it would appear that the right to continue 
after normal court hours exists.  In the Twayie case52, Kotze J, 
obiter, dealt with duties of State officials and stated, “Die 
aanduiding...is dat dit van hierdie mense, net soos van ander 
normale mense, verwag word om soms ook ‘na ure’ te werk.”  The 
court further noted, “Dit is so goed soos die argument...dat daar op ŉ 
                                                     





Vrydag tot een minuut voor middernag borg verleen mag word maar 
nie twee minute later nie.” 
 
It must be accepted that the situation of an accused may change 
whilst in custody.  At the time of his arrest the accused might not 
have been able to afford legal representation and might have decided 
only to bring a bail application with the assistance of a legal 
representative.  One cannot argue that this should result in his bail 
application not be viewed as an urgent one. 
 
3.1(c) Summary
The practice of bringing bail applications after hours or proceeding 
with bail applications after hours was a common practice in District 
and Regional Court before 1998. 
 
Section 50 was substantially amended in the last decade.  As a result 
of the decision in the Twayie53 case, parliament added two 
subsections – 50(6) and 50(7).  In terms of these sections, bail 
applications could be brought outside of normal court hours.   
 
Section 50(6) reads: 
 
“When a person is arrested for the alleged commission of an 
offence, he or she shall be informed as soon as possible of his 
or her right to institute bail proceedings and, if he or she is not 
granted bail under section 59, he or she shall at his or her 
request be brought before a lower court as soon as it is 
reasonably possible for consideration for his or her bail 
application.” 
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Section 50(7) reads: 
 
“If a person is arrested on suspicion of having committed an 
offence, but a charge has not been brought against him or her 
because further investigation is needed to determine whether a 
charge may be brought against him or her, the investigation in 
question shall be completed as soon as it is reasonably possible 
and the person in question shall as soon as it is reasonably 
possible thereafter, and in any even not later than the day after 
his or her arrest contemplated in subsections (1) and (2), be 
brought before an ordinary court of law to be charged and 
enabled to institute bail proceedings in accordance with 
subsection (6) or be informed of the reason for his or her 
further detention, failing which he or she shall be released.” 
 
It is evident from the text of these two sections that a right to bail was 
entrenched in the legislation.  During this period both the legislature 
and Parliament acknowledged this right to liberty. 
 
Sadly both these sections have been amended or repealed.  Act 85 of 
1997 has amended s 50(6) which will be discussed hereunder, and s 
50(7) was repealed by the same legislation. 
 
J van der Berg54 wrote extensively on bail in South Africa and voiced 
his dissatisfaction with the amendment, noting: 
 
“The irony inherent in this reactionary measure is, of course, 
striking: a procedural human right deemed under the old order 
through creative and enlightened judicial interpretation has 
been summarily taken away by decree of the new order.” 
 
Any human rights lawyer cannot but wholeheartedly agree with this 
statement of the writer. 
 
                                                     





Up to this time in our history, the right to bail was acknowledged by 
our courts and legislature.  The courts also viewed bail applications 
as urgent applications before or after the first appearance in a lower 
court by the accused. 
 
3.2 Chapter 9 after 1 August 1998 
The Criminal Procedure Second Amendment Act 85 of 1997 amended 
various sections in Chapter 9 of the CPA which have direct bearing 
on the right to be released on bail, to be heard by a magistrate and it 
influenced the hearing of a bail application on an urgent basis. 
 
Once again these issues will be dealt with in the two stages, namely 
the periods before and after the first appearance after an arrest of an 
accused in court.` 
 
3.2.1 The First Stage 
The most significant amendment made by Act 85 of 1997 is the 
inclusion of s 50(6)(b) to the CPA.   
 
Section 50(6)(b) of the CPA currently reads, “An arrested person 
contemplated in paragraph (a)(i) is not entitled to be brought to court 
outside ordinary court hours.” 
 
This section unequivocally states that the accused has no right to be 
brought before a court outside normal court hours to be released on 
bail by a magistrate. 
 
However, it does not mean that no person is allowed to be released on 
bail after hours.  In certain circumstances certain authorized persons 
are allowed by law to release an accused on bail. 
 
3.2.1 (a) Police Bail 
Bail can be granted by any police official of or above the rank of a 
non-commissioned officer before the first appearance of an accused 






This authority is limited by s 59(1)(a) of the CPA to offences other 
than offences referred to in Part II of Part III of the schedules of the 
CPA. 
 
This section gives the accused a right to apply for bail to the police for 
less serious offences.  The situation becomes problematic when a 
person is arrested for an offence for which the police can set bail, but 
the police are opposed to the release of the accused on bail or refuse 
to assist the accused. 
 
The arrested person cannot apply to the court after hours to contest 
the detention.  Section 50(6)(b) clearly states that the accused “is not 
entitled” to apply to a magistrate to be released on bail. 
 
In practice, this would mean that the accused should sit out the 48 
hours over weekends until his first appearance in a lower court.  This 
is clearly contrary to the position prior to 1 August 1998 when the 
accused was entitled to approach a magistrate to be released on bail.  
During week days, an applicant may be brought in court hours before 
the 48 hours have lapsed.   
 
This is a direct violation of an accused’s right to be released on bail.  
The constitutional violation of an accused’s rights will be fully 
discussed separately. 
 
3.2.1 (b) Bail by the Director of Public Prosecutions 
Section 59A of the CPA was inserted by s 3 of Act 85 of 1997.  Section 
59A reads: 
 
“An attorney-general (Director of Public Prosecutions) or a 
prosecutor authorised thereto in writing by the attorney-
general concerned may, in respect of the offences referred to in 
Schedule 7 and in consultation with the police official charged 







Schedule 7 was added to the schedules in the CPA by s 10 of Act 85 
of 1997.  Without repeating the contents of schedule 7, it contains 
less serious offences such as public violence, culpable homicide, 
bestiality, theft and robbery (without aggravating circumstances) 
where the value is less than R20 000.00. 
 
This section however poses the same infringements on an 
accused’s right to bail as s 59 of the CPA. 
 
At this stage I will not deal with the constitutionality of this section as 
it will be fully discussed later. 
 
However, s 59A of the CPA infringes on certain rights of the accused 
that were given under the old order. 
 
3.3 Infringements on rights of accused 
3.3.1 Right to apply to court for bail
If the accused wishes to bring a bail application, the accused or his 
legal representative must approach the prosecutor to be released on 
bail. 
 
In terms of s 59A(1), the prosecutor must consult with the 
investigating officer before bail can be set.  If the investigator is 
opposed to bail, the prosecutor may still set bail.  This will only 
happen in the rare occasions since both the prosecutor and the police 
are acting for the State. 
 
In the event of the prosecutor refusing to set bail, the position of the 
accused is the same as under s 59 of the CPA. 
 
Section 50(6)(b) of the CPA prohibits the accused from bringing a bail 
application to a magistrate.   
 
This section stands in direct contrast with all the decisions of the 





1 August 1998.  In the Twayie case55 this right to bring a bail 
application was well-established.  In the Appeal Court’s decision of 
Minister van Wet en Orde en Ander v Dipper56 the court ruled 
unanimously that: 
 
“An accused, who is in custody, is entitled to make application 
for his release on bail before the expiry of the period of 48 
hours referred to in s 50(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 
1977, that is before his compulsory first appearance in a lower 
court in terms of s 50(1) but also includes a first appearance at 
the accused’s own request.” 
 
The legislator attempted to restrict the infringement created by s 
50(6)(b) of the CPA by authorizing a Prosecutor to grant bail.  This is 
a poor attempt as it creates various other procedural problems for the 
accused who wishes to apply for bail. 
 
In terms of s 59 and s 59A of the CPA, an accused can only apply for 
bail after hours for offences set out in Part I of Sched 2, Sched 3 and 
Sched 7 of the CPA. 
 
An accused cannot apply for bail for any offence in Sched 1 that is 
not mentioned in Sched 7.  An application for an offence under Sched 
5 and 6 of the CPA is also not authorized by the CPA.   
 
This means that an accused can only apply for bail before his first 
appearance in a lower court, for certain less serious offences.  After 
hour bail applications were permitted for any offence prior to 1 
August 1998.  Magistrates and prosecutors convened at any hour of 
the day to hear the application.   
 
The current legal position creates a problem for the accused who is in 
custody for an offence, viz the right to be heard during the 
proceedings.   
                                                     
55 Twayie v Minister van Justisie 1986(2) SA 101 (O). 





3.3.2 The audi alteram partem rule 
A person who is in custody for a bailable offence may apply to a 
prosecutor to be released on bail.  If the state, being the investigator 
and the prosecutor, refuse to hear the application or oppose the 
application, the accused may not apply for bail to a magistrate.   
 
Section 59A makes no provision for the audi alteram partem rule57.  
Section 59A(1) of the CPA only refers to “consultation with the police 
official.”  There is no duty on the prosecutor to liaise or consult with 
the accused or his legal representative in determining whether or not 
bail should be granted. 
 
The section does not even make mention that the prosecutor, in any 
manner, has to entertain representations for the accused or his legal 
representative to persuade the prosecutor to grant bail.  The situation 
is the same pertaining to the amount of bail, in the event of the 
prosecutor setting bail. 
 
It has been suggested58 “that an accused can – where appropriate – 
bring an application for release on bail in terms of s 59A and that the 
audi alteram partem rule should apply.” 
 
One must agree with this view that the audi alteram partem rule 
should apply in bail applications.  This however is not attainable if an 
application to court is not permitted.  The two opposing parties are 
the police, represented by the prosecutor, and the accused, 
represented by an attorney or advocate. 
 
One must raise the question of who will apply the audi alteram 
partem rule?   
 
The prosecutor has a clear conflict of interest.  It is expected of the 
prosecutor to represent the interest of the State and apply his/her 
mind to the submissions of the apposing party being himself/herself 
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and those on behalf of the accused.  This procedure is most 
undesirable in law and particularly in criminal procedural law.   
 
Section 59A of the CPA does not prescribe to, nor authorise the 
prosecutor to apply the audi alteram partem rule. 
 
The right to be heard is indisputably infringed upon by s 59A of the 
CPA59.  These statutory provisions infringe upon the liberty of the 
detained person who is presumed innocent. 
 
It has been argued60: 
 
“Where a provision in a statute, or a proclamation or a notice 
issued under an enactment, prejudicially affects the liberty or 
existing rights, or possibly property, of a person affected by the 
statute or proclamation or notice, the maxim audi alteram 
partem (literally translated to “hear the other side”) rule would 
generally be implied.” 
 
Section 59A of the CPA is a very useful amendment to the criminal 
procedures relating to bail. However it needs amendment to deal with 
the situation when the State is opposed to the release of an accused 
person on bail.  The usefulness of this section only refers to 
unopposed bail applications.  The State should not be the arbiter as 
to whether bail should or should not be granted to an accused. 
 
3.3.3 The right to an independent arbiter61
Section 59A of the CPA removes the function of the court to hear a 
bail application in terms of this section, and allows the prosecutor to 
be the arbiter. 
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Our courts ruled, pre the 1998 period, that the function of hearing 
bail applications is a judicial one.  In the Novick case62, the court 
ruled: 
 
“The State, in that context the relevant policemean, is not 
entitled to be the arbiter as to whether an accused is entitled to 
bail or not.  At the very least the police must make the accused 
available for a bail application and make it possible for him to 
apply for bail and so leave it to the court to consider whether 
an accused is entitled to bail or not.” 
 
Without dealing with the constitutional implications pertaining to s 
59A of the CPA63, one must accept that an accused had a right pre-
1998 and pre-constitutional era to be heard by an independent 
arbiter in a bail application. 
 
3.3.4 The right to be released on bail 
As discussed above, it is evident that bail can only be set for an 
accused in terms of s 59 and 59A of the CPA. 
 
A prosecutor is not authorized to set bail, even if it is unopposed, for 
an accused if the offence falls in the ambit of Schedule 1 and not in 
Schedule 7.  Furthermore the release on bail for a Schedule 5 or 6 
offence in terms of the CPA is unauthorized. 
 
The reason for this is that only a court can set bail for these 
scheduled offences.  These offences are non-bailable in terms of s 59 
and s 59A of the CPA until the first appearance in terms of s 50 of the 
CPA in a Magistrate’s court. 
 
As previously discussed, s 50(6)(b) reads: “An arrested person…is not 
entitled to be brought to court outside ordinary court hours.” 
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The right to be released on bail is to a great extent affected by the 
schedule of the offence.  The right to be released on bail will not be 
infringed when a person is arrested for a sched 7 offence and 
released.  However, when a person is arrested for a sched 1 offence 
and not released purely based on the schedule of the offence, a 
violation of these rights will occur.  The violation will be even greater 
in the event of an unopposed application64. 
 
3.3.4 (a) The onus in relation to the right to be released on bail 
It is of the utmost importance, before bringing a bail application after 
hours, to establish whether the offence falls within bailable offences. 
 
An accused person is not entitled to bring a bail application after 
hours for a schedule 1, 5 or 6 offence as set out in the CPA. 
 
It is of importance to note that the burden of proof is different between 
schedules 1, 5 and 6 of the CPA.  This is a clear indicator of the 
procedural difficulties created with the implementation of s 59A of the 
CPA. 
 
Section 57 and 57A of the CPA make no mention of an onus on any 
party when applying for bail.  Section 57A(7) reads: 
“for all purposes of this Act…bail granted in terms of this 
section shall be regarded as bail granted by a court in terms of 
section 60.” 
 
Section 60(1)(a) of the CPA reads: 
 
“An accused who is in custody in respect of any offence shall, 
subject to the provisions of section 50(6), be entitled to be 
released on bail at any stage preceding his or her conviction in 
respect of such offence, if the court is satisfied that the 
interests of justice so permit.” 
 
Section 60(1)(a) must be read with section 60(11), which reads: 
                                                     





“Notwithstanding any provision of this Act where an accused is 
charged with an offence referred to – 
 
(a) in schedule 6, the court shall order that the accused be 
detained in custody until he or she is dealt with in 
accordance with the law, unless the accused, having 
been given a reasonable opportunity to do so, adduces 
evidence which satisfies the court that exceptional 
circumstances exist which in the interest of justice 
permit his or her release; 
 
(b) in schedule 5, but not in schedule 6…adduces evidence 
which satisfies the court that the interests of justice 
permit his or her release.” 
 
Section 60(11)(a) and (b) place an onus on the accused to satisfy the 
court in schedule 5 offences that it is in the interest of justice to be 
released on bail.  In schedule 6, an additional requirement is to show 
or prove exceptional circumstances by the applicant.   
 
Section 60(11) places a burden on the accused when applying for 
bail.  This burden only pertains to offences referred to in schedules 5 
and 6 of the CPA.  The CPA does not place a burden of proof on the 
accused in the other instances when a bail application is brought. 
 
It has been argued65 that the onus should rest on the State when an 
accused applies for bail, excluding the situations which are covered 
by s 60(11) of the CPA.   
 
This view was also held in the full bench discussion of S v 
Tshabalala66.   
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Comrie J ruled: 
 
“Leaving s 60(11) aside for a moment, s 60(1)(a) entitled an 
arrested person to be released on bail unless the court finds 
that it is in the interest of justice that he or she be detained in 
custody…; it seemed that there had to be a practical burden on 
the State to adduce evidence or information going to show that 
such a likelihood existed…  If this was not an onus or proof, 
then surely it was something very close thereto.” 
 
The applicant applying for bail before his first appearance in court is 
faced with certain procedural problems. 
 
When applying for bail for a schedule 7 offence, he does not bear any 
onus to show why he should be released on bail.  However, the 
applicant must apply to the respondent to be released on bail.  The 
State (respondent) who bares the onus to show why the applicant 
may not be released or why a higher amount of bail is required may 
refuse bail or set an amount of bail. 
 
If the accused (applicant) wishes to contest the decision of the 
prosecutor, he may not be able to do so.  Section 50(6)(b) of the CPA 
prohibits the applicant from approaching a court after hours. 
Schedule 1 of the CPA contains all the offences referred to in 
schedules 5, 6 and 7.   
 
Any offence that falls within the ambit of schedule 1 but not 
schedules 5, 6 and 7 for the purpose of bail applications can be 
deemed as a schedule 1 offence, ie attempted murder not involving 
the infliction of grievous bodily harm.  This would mean that when a 
person is arrested for such an offence, it would be deemed as a 
schedule 1 offence for the purpose of a bail application and the onus 
would rest on the State67. 
 
                                                     





When a person is arrested for a schedule 1 offence, he would not be 
allowed to bring a bail application.  Bear in mind that the onus to 
show why the release of the application is not permissible rests on 
the State (respondent). 
 
The reasons for this procedural point at issue are: 
 
(i) the prosecutor may not, in terms of s 57A of the CPA, hear 
the bail application; and 
 
(ii) Section 50(6)(b) of the CPA prohibits an arrested person 
from bringing a bail application outside normal court hours. 
 
Once again, an accused is in the same position as he or she would 
have been should he or she have been charged with a schedule 7 
offence for which the prosecutor had refused to grant bail. 
 
This situation is in a sense more untenable as there may very well be 
situations where the State feels bail should be granted on an urgent 
basis but due to the statutory provisions be prohibited from bringing 
the accused to court. 
 
This statutory prohibition is a direct violation of an accused’s right to 
bring a bail application and to be released on bail.  There are various 
constitutional infringements of an accused’s right which will be dealt 
with separately hereunder. 
 
At this point, it is important to acknowledge that rights were granted 
to detained persons under the old order that have summarily been 
taken away by the legislature.  These sections, in particular sections 
50(6)(b) and 57A of the CPA need to be tested by constitutional court 
as well-established rights are being infringed. 
 
3.3.4 (b) Schedules 5 and 6 
The offences under schedules 5 and 6 are different, as discussed 





his or her release is in the interest of justice.  An additional burden is 
placed on the applicant in schedule 6 bail applications in that one 
must show exceptional circumstance why his release is in the 
interest of justice. 
 
In S v Dlamini68 the Constitutional Court held the provisions 
60(11)(d) of the CPA to be constitutional.  However, the issue for the 
purpose of this discussion is not the constitutionality of s 60(11) of 
the CPA but the infringement of the right to bring the bail application 
on an urgent basis and be heard by a court outside normal court 
hours. 
 
An accused person’s legal position is similar to what it would have 
been should the charge have been for an offence under schedule 1. 
 
The only difference is that the accused now has the duty to show why 
he should be released.  As a matter or principle it could be accepted 
that a person who stands to be arraigned for a serious charge bears 
the onus to show why he should be released.  However it does not 
mean that such a person may not be heard immediately.   
 
Schedule 5 offences were included in the CPA with the enactment of 
Act 75 of 1995.  Prior to 1995, the onus rested on the applicant to 
show that his or her release on bail was in the interest of justice69. 
 
“The onus is upon the accused (in his capacity as applicant) to 
prove on a balance of probability that the court should exercise 
its discretion in favour of granting bail and, in discharging this 
burden, he must show that the interest of justice will not be 
prejudiced, namely that it is likely that he will stand his trial 
and that he will not tamper with State witnesses or otherwise 
interfere with administration of justice or the investigation of 
the case against him.”70
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If this was the accepted legal position at the time, one must accept 
that the fact that an accused person bears an onus did not preclude 
him from bringing an application for bail outside normal court hours 
under the old order.   
 
In fact all the jurisprudence pertaining to bail pre 1995 was dealt 
with as if the accused bore the onus to show that his release was in 
the interest of justice. 
 
The onus placed on the accused by schedule 5 offences as referred to 
in s 60(11) is similar to, if not exactly the same as, the position prior 
to the enactment of legislation that created schedule 5 and 6 
offences. 
 
The legal position should be that an accused is entitled to bring a bail 
application after hours with the understanding that in certain 
instances as set out in s 60(11) of the CPA the accused will bear the 
onus to prove why he must be released on bail. 
 
3.3.5 The right to an appeal or review 
The prosecutor, as respondent in the applications, also becomes the 
adjudicator in the proceedings.  This situation is very undesirable 
and cannot be seen as a fair process in the criminal justice system.  
In addition, it would appear that the applicant cannot appeal the 
decision of the prosecutor. 
 
Section 59A(6) reads: 
 
“The provisions of s 64 with regard to the recording of bail 
proceedings by a court apply, with the necessary changes, in 
respect of bail granted in terms of this section.” 
 
Section 64 reads: 
 
                                                                                                                                                      





“The court dealing with bail proceedings as contemplated in 
section 50(6) or which considers bail under section 60 or which 
imposes any further condition under section 62 or which, 
under section 63 or 63A, amends the amount of bail or amends 
or supplements any condition or refuses to do so, shall record 
the relevant proceedings in full, including the conditions 
imposed and any amendment or supplementation thereof, or 
shall cause such proceedings to be recorded in full, and where 
such court is a magistrate’s court or a regional court, any 
document purporting to be an extract from the record of 
proceedings of that court and purporting to be certified as 
correct by the clerk of the court, and which sets out the 
conditions of bail and any amendment or supplementation 
thereof, shall, on its mere production in any court in which the 
relevant charge is pending, be prima facie proof of such 
conditions or any amendment or supplementation thereof.” 
 
One must accept that the prosecutor becomes the “court” in the 
decision-making process pertaining to the accused release on bail71.  
If the aggrieved applicant wishes to appeal the proceeding or the 
finding of the prosecutor, he would not be able to do so.  The reason 
for this is that there will be no court record to on which to appeal or 
judgement against which to appeal.  The record of bail proceedings in 
terms of s 57A of the CPA is only kept according to ss (6) “in respect 
of bail granted in terms of this section.” 
 
This situation is a clear violation of the accused person’s right to 
appeal or review of the decision72. 
 
Section 65(1)(a) of the CPA gives an accused the right to appeal.  An 
accused does not have to obtain leave to appeal when bail is refused.  
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It was also held by our high courts that no leave to appeal is required 
in terms of s 309B of the CPA73. 
 
Leaving the constitutional violations aside regarding the right to 
appeal or review, it is evident that the provisions of s 59A are a 
procedural violation of an accused person’s right to appeal.  However 
an accused may still apply for bail in terms of s 60 of the CPA at his 
first appearance in a lower court.  The Magistrate will then hear the 
application de novo74. 
 
3.4 The Second Stage 
At the first appearance of an accused in a lower court 
Bail proceedings in court at and after an accused person’s first 
appearance is covered by s 60 of the CPA subject to s 50(6) of the 
same Act. 
 
Section 60(1)(a) currently reads: 
 
“An accused who is in custody in respect of an offence shall, 
subject to the provisions of section 50(6), be entitled to be 
released on bail at any stage preceding his or her conviction 
in respect of such offence, if the court is satisfied that the 
interests of justice so permit.” 
 
The position of an accused person appears to be the same as it was 
pre 1998 in relation to s 60 of the CPA.  However the release of an 
accused person is currently subject to the provision of s 50(6) of the 
CPA.  This section frustrates the right to be released on bail.  Urgent 
bail applications are primarily postponed on the basis of s 50(6)(d) of 
the CPA.   
 
It is well established that bail applications are always urgent 
applications.   
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Leon ADJP clearly illustrated the urgency in bail applications and 
ruled “the matter is one of utmost urgency as it concerns the liberty 
of the subject.” 75
                                                     





This well established right was nullified with the enactment of s 50(6) 
of the CPA.  The right to bring a bail application outside court hours 
is prohibited by s 50(6)(b).  One would expect that a detainee would 
be able to insist that his application be heard after the expiry of the 
48 hours contemplated in s 50 of the CPA. 
 
At his or her first appearance in a lower court, an accused person is 
faced with the provisions of s 50(6)(d) of the CPA, which reads: 
 
“(d) The lower court before which a person is brought in 
terms of this subsection, may postpone any bail proceedings or 
bail application to any date or court, for a period not exceeding 
seven days at a time, on the terms which the court may deem 
proper and which are not inconsistent with any provision of 
this Act, if – 
 
(i) the court is of the opinion that it has insufficient 
information or evidence at its disposal to reach a 
decision on the bail application; 
(ii) the prosecutor informs the court that the matter 
has been or is going to be referred to an attorney-
general for the issuing of a written confirmation 
referred to in section 60(11A); 
(iii) …  
[Sub-para (iii) deleted by s 8(1)(c) of Act 62 of 2000.] 
(iv) it appears to the court that it is necessary to 
provide the State with a reasonable opportunity to 
–  
(aa) procure material evidence that may 
be lost if bail is granted; or 
(bb) perform the functions referred to in 
section 37; or 
(v) it appears to the court that it is necessary in the 






After scrutinising s 50(6)(d) and the subsections, most scholars in 
criminal procedure will argue that the provisions of this section are 
proper in any criminal justice system. 
 
The argument will probably be supported by the perception that the 
remand of a period not exceeding seven days will only be granted “on 
the terms which the court may deem proper”. 
 
This is however not the case in practice.  When this issue was 
investigated in practice, it appeared that this section is misused by 
the State and the application is rubber stamped by our court.  All the 
applications by the State are brought in the lower courts and more 
particularly in the Magistrate’s Courts76. 
 
Our High Courts have never ruled on the provisions of s 50(6)(d) and 
no appeal has been lodged against the granting or refusal of an 
application in terms of this section. 
 
During research in Cape Town Magistrate’s Court and particularly 
court 16 which deals with opposed bail applications, it was found77 
that applications brought in terms of s 50(6)(d) are always granted by 
the courts. 
 
It appears that when the application by the State is opposed by the 
accused person or legal representative, the courts respond that the 
State is entitled to such an adjournment. 
 
In analysing the subsection of s 50(6)(d)(i)-(v) of the CPA, it is evident 
that a remand should only be granted if the court deems it necessary.  
However, I could not find any case in court 16 where the State had 
led evidence in terms of ss 50(d)(i) to warrant an adjournment.   
 
I could also not find that any application was brought by the State in 
terms of ss 50(6)(d)(iv) to justify such an adjournment. 
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I could not find any matter where written confirmation was sought or 
given by the Director of Public Prosecutions. 
 
The standard request from the State appears to be that the State 
requests a remand for seven days as the State does not have sufficient 
information to release the accused person on bail.   
 
It appears to be the interpretation of the State and the lower courts 
that the State is entitled to such a postponement. 
 
S van der Merwe is of the view78 that: 
 
“Although the decision to postpone bail proceedings apparently 
lies entirely with the lower court, it has no choice but to 
postpone such proceedings where it is informed by the 
prosecutor either that the matter is or has been referred to a 
Director of Public Prosecutions for the issuing of a written 
confirmation in terms of s 60(11A).” 
 
If the courts accept the standpoint that the State is entitled to 
adjournments, it will definitely infringe upon the accused person’s 
right to have his bail application heard on an urgent basis. 
 
Section 50(6) grants the court the discretion as to whether a 
postponement should be granted, stating, “The lower court before 
which a person is brought in terms of this subsection may postpone 
any bail proceeding or bail application.” 
 
It can never be said that the court has no choice but to postpone the 
proceedings.  The provisions are not peremptory, but give a discretion 
to the courts as to whether or not it is prudent to grant or refuse 
remands.  The current interpretation of the lower courts in Cape 
Town indicates that section 50(6)(d) of the CPA is open to abuse by 
the State. 
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Unfortunately it never happens that the decision to grant remands by 
the lower courts is appealed.   
 
The reason for this is that the bail application is finalised before a 
date of an appeal can be given in the High Court.   
 
It is also very costly to litigate in the High Courts and very few people 
have the funds to do so; they rather wait for seven days. 
 
J van der Berg proposes the correct approach towards adjournments 
in terms of s 50(6) of the CPA, which recognizes the urgency of bail 
applications.79
 
When a person appears before a lower court for the first time and the 
State requests a remand in terms of s 50(6)(d), the court should 
proceed as follows: 
 
Firstly, the court should read s 50(6) in conjunction with s 50(3) and 
60(2)(a)-(c) of the CPA before granting or refusing a remand in terms 
of s 50(6). 
 
Section 50(3) of the CPA reads as follows: 
 
“Subject to the provisions of subsection (6), nothing in this 
section shall be construed as modifying the provisions of this 
Act or any other law whereby a person under detention may be 
released on bail or on warning or on a written notice to appear 
in court.” 
 
                                                     





When the accused person appears, the court should act in terms of s 
60(2), which reads: 
 
“(2) In bail proceedings the court – 
(a) may postpone any such proceedings as 
contemplated in section 50(3); 
(b) may, in respect of matters that are not in dispute 
between the accused and the prosecutor, acquire 
in an informal manner the information that is 
needed for its decision or order regarding bail; 
(c) may, in respect of matters that are in dispute 
between the accused and the prosecutor, require of 
the prosecutor or the accused, as the case may be, 
that evidence be adduced;” 
 
Only after the court has exhausted all the avenues in ss 60(2)(b) and 
60(20(c) and is still not in the position to grant or refuse bail may 
they act in terms of s 60(3) of the CPA which reads: 
 
“(3) If the court is of the opinion that it does not have reliable 
or sufficient information or evidence at its disposal or that it 
lacks certain important information to reach a decision on the 
bail application, the presiding officer shall order that such 
information or evidence be placed before the court.” 
 
It must be understood that s 50(6)(d) of the CPA is not peremptory 
and that the State is not entitled to a remand. 
 
Section 60(3) of the CPA is peremptory and only after the court has 
dealt with the accused person in terms of s 60(2) of the CPA, and 
after the court is of the opinion that it has insufficient information, 
may it adjourn the proceedings to obtain the necessary information. 
 
During my research in the criminal court in Cape Town, I found that 





remand in terms of s 50(6)(d) of the CPA.  It is never stated for what 
reason and the remand is always granted. 
 
This interpretation is a direct violation of an accused person’s right to 
be heard on an urgent basis. 
 
Unfortunately adjournments in terms of s 50(6)(d) of the CPA are not 
subject to automatic review of the High Court and have never been 
reported in law journals as having been appealed. 
 






4. THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE SECOND AMENDMENT, ACT 85 
OF 1997 
The exposition of an accused person’s rights, prior to the enactment 
of the Criminal Procedure Second amendment Act, accentuates the 
rights of a detainee. 
 
These rights are: 
 
(i) The right to liberty coupled with 
(ii) the right to be released on bail on an urgent basis.80 
(iii) The right to have a bail application heard by a court outside 
normal court hours.81 
(iv) The right to appear in a court and to have her case heard by 
a court.82 
 
It is evident, with reference to the reported case 83 that these rights 
were established and granted to a detainee in the pre-constitutional 
era of South Africa. 
 
The drafters of our interim Constitution Act 200 of 1993 and the final 
Constitution 108 of 1996 acknowledged these rights and entrenched 
them in our Constitution. 
 
4.1 Entrenched rights in bail proceedings in the interim 
constitution 
 
Section 25 (2) of the interim constitution84 reads: 
 
Every person arrested for the alleged commission of an offence 
shall, in addition to the rights which he or she as a detained 
person, has the right – (b) as soon as reasonably possible, but 
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83 Supra 49-50. 





not later than 48 hours after the arrest or, if the said period of 
48 hours expires outside ordinary court hours be brought 
before an ordinary court of law and to be charged or to be 
informed of the reason for his or her further detention, failing 
which he or she shall be entitled to be released.” 
 
This section alone acknowledges three of the rights that were 
established pertaining to bail. 
 
(i) the detained person has the right to be released on bail. 
 
(ii) The urgency of bail applications and the right to bring such 
an application outside court hours was entrenched with the 
word “as soon as reasonably possible, but not later than 48 
hours after the arrest.” 
 
(iii) The words “brought before an ordinary court” acknowledge 
the right to have the bail application heard by a Magistrate 
of Judge. 
 
Section 22 of the Interim Constitution also strengthens the 
right to an independent and impartial forum.  The section 
reads: 
 
“Every person shall have the right to have justicible 
disputes settled by a court of law or, where appropriate, 
another independent or impartial forum.” 
 
(iv) Lastly section 11(1) acknowledged the right to freedom and 
security of a person, particularly the right not to be 
detained without trial.   
 
One may now surely argue that the rights granted under the old 







4.2 Entrenched rights in bail proceedings in the final constitution, 
Act 108 of 1996 
The final Constitution was signed into law by the former President 
Nelson Mandela at Sharpville on the 4th of February 1997. 
 
The 34 Constitutional principles set out foundations of our democratic 
republic.  The Constitution is now the supreme law of our land and 
fundamental rights and freedom of all citizens are protected. 
 
These rights included the rights in the interim Constitution.  The 
liberty of a subject is also protected by the final Constitution which 
includes the right of an accused person to be released pending his / 
her fair trial in a criminal court. 
 
These rights will be fully discussed, however need to be mentioned. 
 
(i) Section 12 deals with the freedom and security of a person. 
(ii) Section 33 enshrines the right to just administrative action. 
(iii) Section 34 grants everybody access to courts. 
(iv) Section 35 grants specific rights to arrested, detained and 
accused persons, more particularly to be released on bail 
pending a criminal trial. 
 
These rights granted to all citizens during the years of apartheid 
through judgments by Supreme and Appeal Courts and 
acknowledged by the interim Constitution are now entrenched in the 
final Constitution of South Africa.  
 
Unfortunately these rights are infringed upon by the enactment of the 
Criminal Procedure Second Amendment Act 85 of 1997. 
 
These rights will be discussed fully, followed by the infringement 
upon it, and whether these infringements are justifiable in an open 
and democratic society. 
 





5. THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM AND SECURITY OF 
THE PERSON (SECTION 12 OF ACT 108 OF 
1996) 
This section is a combination of the right to freedom and security of a 
person and the person’s right to bodily and psychological integrity.  
With this discussion, the emphasis will be on ss 12(1)(a)-(e) which 
deal with the freedom and the security of a person. 
 
Section 12 reads: 
 
“Everyone has the right to freedom and security of the person, 
which includes the right – 
(a) not to be deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without just 
cause; 
 
(b) not to be detained without trial; 
 
(c) to be free from all forms of violence from either public 
or private sources; 
 
(d) not to be tortured in any way; and 
 
(e) not to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or 
degrading way.” 
 
It has been argued that the definition of s 12 should not end with the 
word “freedom”.   
 
Freedom is only the beginning of the enquiry and “freedom” is the 
threshold of the enquiry85.   
 
The existence of both these components in the application of s 12(1) 
was confirmed in the Constitutional Court decision of De Lange v 
Smuts86. 
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Ackerman J confirmed both components and ruled87: 
 
“s 12(1), in entrenching the right to freedom and security of the 
person, entrenches the two different aspects of the right to 
freedom referred to above.  The one that O’Regan J… called the 
right not to be deprived of liberty ‘for reasons that are not 
acceptable’ or what may also conveniently be described as the 
substantive aspect of the protection of freedom, is given 
express entrenchment in s 12(1)(a) which protects individuals 
against deprivation of freedom ‘arbitrarily or without just 
cause’.  The other, which may be described as the procedural 
aspect of the protection of freedom, is implicit in s 12(1) as it 
was in s 11(1) of the interim Constitution …  The substantive 
and the procedural aspects of the protection of freedom are 
different, serve different purposes and have to be satisfied 
conjunctively.  The substantive aspect ensures that a 
deprivation of liberty cannot take place without satisfactory or 
adequate reasons for doing so.  In the first place it may not 
occur ‘arbitrarily’; there must in other words be a rational 
connection between the deprivation and some objectively 
determinable purpose.  If such rational connection does not 
exist the substantive aspect of the protection of freedom has by 
that fact alone been denied.  But even if such rational 
connection exists, it is by itself insufficient; the purpose, 
reason or ‘cause’ for the deprivation must be a ‘just ‘one…  
Although paragraph (b) of s 12(1) only refers to the right ‘not to 
be detained without trial’ and no specific reference is made to 
the other procedural components of such trial it is implicit that 
the trial must be a ‘fair’ trial, but not that such trial must 
necessarily comply with all the requirements of s 35(3).  This 
was the Court’s unanimous holding in respect of s 11(1) of the 
interim Constitution in Nel’s case and is equally applicable to s 
12(1)(b) in the context of the entrenchment of the ‘right to 
freedom and security of the person’ in s 12(1) of the 1996 
                                                     





Constitution, there being no material difference between the 
two provisions.” 
 
There is a school of thought that argues, in the light of the 
Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence, that the standard set by s 
12(1)(a) may be particularized in three questions88, these three 
questions being: 
 
1) Has there been a deprivation of physical freedom? 
2) Is the reason for the deprivation of freedom acceptable? 
3) Is the manner of deprivation of freedom procedurally fair? 
 
The question at hand is whether a person who is arrested for an 
offence may rely on the protection of his or her right to freedom in 
terms of s 12(1) of the Constitution. 
 
According to these authors, the deprivation of physical freedom is a 
threshold enquiry.  Both the substantial as well as the procedural 
protection granted by s12(1) should be applied. 
 
The argument is thus that once it is showed that a person’s liberty is 
deprived by any law or conduct, it must be shown that the reason for 
the deprivation is acceptable (substantive protection).  In addition, 
the manner of depriving must be procedurally fair (procedural 
protection). 
 
Once it has been established that the State did not comply with the 
reason or the manner of the deprivation, the State has to prove that 




The question now remains whether or not the arrest and detention of 
a person for any offence violates his or her constitutional right to 
freedom and security.  One should also consider the implications of 
                                                     





the Criminal Procedure Second Amendment Act 85 of 1997 on a 
detained person and the contribution towards the violation of the 
right envisaged in s 12(1) of the Constitution. 
 
The answer to this question lies in the application of the three 
formulated questions already discussed. 
 
(i) The threshold : deprivation of physical freedom 
In answering the question posed as to whether a deprivation of 
physical freedom exists, one should consider whether the action 
constitutes a deprivation of physical freedom. 
 
There is a school of thought that argues that one must consider the 
duration, degree and the intensity of the constraint that has been 
imposed in determining whether a person has been deprived of 
liberty89.  In addition, one should further asses “the situation of the 
person affected and the degree of freedom prior to the restraint.”90
 
The arrest of a person for any offence is a definite deprivation of 
physical freedom.  When a person living from day to day is arrested 
for an offence, particularly a schedule 7 or 1 offence, and is placed in 
a cell, this constitutes a deprivation of physical freedom. 
 
Ackerman J, when considering the provisions of s 12(1) of the 
Constitution, ruled “In its ordinary grammatical sense, ‘detention’ is a 
word of wide meaning and relates to ‘keeping in custody or 
confinement, arrest’”.91
 
This view held by the Constitutional Court is correct and further that 
one should accept an arrest to be a deprivation of physical freedom.  
In doing so, one does not place the threshold too low in that it will 
hinder essential and effective police activities. 
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If the level of the threshold is higher, it may mean that one is not 
protected against arbitrary conduct.  The enquiry does not end, 
however, when it is established that a person is deprived of physical 
freedom. 
 
The enquiry proceeds with the application of the substantive and 
procedural protection elements. 
 
(ii) Substantive Protection 
One should question the reason for the deprivation to establish 
whether it is acceptable. 
 
The gist of the substantive protection appears to be that the 
deprivation of a person’s freedom should be for a just cause. 
 
Ackerman J ruled92: 
 
“It is not possible to attempt, in advance, a comprehensive 
definition of what should constitute a ‘just cause’ for the 
deprivation of freedom in all imaginable circumstances.  The 
law in this regard must be developed incrementally and on a 
case by case basis.  Suffice it to say that the concept of ‘just 
cause’ must be grounded upon and consonant with the values 
expressed in s 1 of the 1996 Constitution…and gathered from 
the provisions of the Constitution as a whole.  I wish to say no 
more about ‘just cause’ than is necessary for the decision of the 
present case.” 
 
O’Regan J dealt with this issue93 and ruled: 
 
“Requiring deprivation of freedom to be in accordance with 
procedural fairness is a substantive commitment in the 
Constitution…even when fair and lawful procedures have been 
followed, the deprivation of freedom will not be constitutional 
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because the grounds upon which freedom has been curtailed 
are unacceptable.” 
 
Generally speaking, this means that the cause for the deprivation of 
freedom should be ‘just’ and based on grounds that are fair according 
to lawful procedures. 
 
In general one may accept that it is just to arrest a person where 
reasonable grounds exist to believe that an offence was committed by 
the arrested person and a summons will not suffice.  Once a person is 
arrested, it must be established whether there is reason for further 
detention. 
 
“Stricter scrutiny will be employed when the deprivation of freedom 
amounts to longer periods of detention or imprisonment.”94
 
The primary aim of bail is to ensure that an accused person presents 
himself / herself at court.95  Should no likelihood exist, as 
contemplated in s 60(4)(a) – (e) of the CPA viz that the release of the 
accused will allow him to endanger the safety of the community, 
commit further offences, tamper with evidence, influence witnesses or 
should the release not be in the interest of justice, then the accused 
should be released on bail immediately. 
 
Ackerman J in the De Lange decision ruled96: 
 
“In this sense the imprisonment mechanism is very closely 
tailored to the purpose it is intended to serve and goes no 
further than is absolutely necessary to achieve its objective.” 
 
When a person is arrested for a scheduled offence and the State and 
the accused are ad idem that he or she should be released, even after 
court hours, it should be done on an urgent basis. 
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However the right to freedom and security of a person is infringed by 
s 50(6)(b) of the CPA that clearly prohibits any bail applications 
outside normal court hours.  The result of this section is that a 
person for must wait for 48 hours or more before his or her release, 
and unwarranted detention is the consequence of the section and 
does not meet the requirements of substantive protection.  Further 
deprivation of freedom may result in a violation of the right to 
freedom.   
 
Arguments may also be made that in certain circumstances, for 
example where a person was arrested after he avoided the police 
deliberately to avoid arrest, it may be just.  Such an argument is 
correct and does not constitute a violation of the rights in s 12 (1) of 
the Constitution. 
 
(iii) Procedural Protection 
The third aspect that forms part of the enquiry is whether fair 
procedures were followed when a person’s liberty was curtailed.  In 
Nel v Roux the court ruled that the circumstances under which the 
liberty was taken away forms the bases of the enquiry.  The nature of 
the fair proceedings pertains to the circumstances97.   
 
It is important to bear in mind that the right to bail will have no effect 
without the right to be heard.   
 
Ideally, the hearing should be conducted by judicial officers on an 
urgent basis and not by prosecutors who are part of the State’s 
machinery.  When a person is arrested and detained and no further 
pre-trial detention is warranted, he or she should be released 
immediately.   
 
The question of further detention should not be answered by a 
prosecutor in executing his or her function in terms of s 59A of the 
CPA, but by a court.   
 
                                                     





In practice, one may find circumstances where the procedural 
unfairness is more explicit than in other circumstances.  The 
common violation that I experience in practice is where persons are 
detained for a schedule 1 or 7 offence as contemplated in the CPA.  In 
both these instances, the State bears the onus to prove why a person 
should be detained.  The “likelihoods” in s 60(4)(a) – (e) are to be 
proven by the State. 
 
The first violation is once again covered by s 50(6)(b) which states, 
“An arrested person…is not entitled to be brought to a court outside 
court hours.” 
 
The result of this section is two-fold where an accused is arrested 
outside of court hours: 
 
1) an accused person may not be able to bring a bail 
application for a significant period of time; 
2) the bail application cannot be heard by a judicial officer for 
a significant period of time. 
 
The only alternative is to apply to the detective in charge of the case 
to grant bail in terms of s 59 of the CPA or to the Prosecutor in terms 
of section 59A of the CPA. 
 
The Prosecutor will then assess the case docket to determine whether 
the offence falls within schedule 1 or 7 of the CPA. 
 
Once the Prosecutor has made a decision on the schedule, the 
accused person may or may not apply for bail.  If the decision is that 
the offence falls within the ambit of schedule 1 of the CPA, the 
accused person will be prohibited to apply for bail.  The position will 
remain the same even if the State is of the view that the release of the 
accused person is in the interest of justice.  A Prosecutor may only 
grant bail if the offence is a schedule 7 offence as set out in the CPA. 
The Prosecutor has to consult the Investigating Officer before bail is 





further recourse if the decision after consultation with the detective, 
is not to grant bail, resulting in an effective refusal of bail. 
 
The refusal of bail in this instance is done by a non-judicial officer.  
The further detention of the accused person is then ordered by a 
person, not a court nor an independent or impartial institution. 
 
The practice of having a Prosecutor who is in fact a party to the 
proceeding hearing a bail application is in violation of a person’s right 
in terms of s 12 of the Constitution.  It also does not meet the 
standards of procedural protection offered by the same section. 
 
Ackerman J ruled: 
 
“Viewed in the light of all the considerations, I would conclude 
that the ‘(fair) trial’ prescribed by s 12 (1) requires, apart from 
anything else, a hearing presided over or conducted by a  
judicial officer in the court structure established by the 1996 
Constitution and in which s 165(1) has vested the judicial 
authority of the Republic.”98
 
This view of the Constitutional Court is also shared by certain writers 
who argue: 
 
“Only judicial officers may preside over a hearing when a 
freedom is at stake.  It is important to note that, in such 
matters, it does not help to provide for an appeal or even 
a full re-hearing of the issue by a court after the 
deprivation of freedom has taken place.”99
 
It is submitted that the practice of having non-judicial officers to 
preside over bail proceedings constitutes a violation of the procedural 
component of the freedom right. 
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The next question that arises is whether the violation is justifiable in 
terms of s 36 (the limitation clause) of the Constitution.  This will be 
discussed under limitations.   
 









6. THE RIGHT TO JUST ADMINISTRATIVE 
ACTION  
Bail may be set extra-curially by a police official of or above the rank 
of non-commissioned officer100 or prosecutor authorised thereto in 
writing by the Director of Public Prosecutions101. 
 
Both these sections appear to be inherently unconstitutional.  These 
sections violate the right to just administrative action in terms of s 33 
of the Constitution102.  Section 33 entrenches the right to written 
reason to anyone who has been adversely affected by administrative 
action103 and a right to review such action by a court or independent 
and impartial tribunal104. 
 
The rights in s 33 of the Constitution were suspended, pending the 
enactment of national legislation required by s 33(3) to “give effect105” 
to the rights106.  The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 
2000 (PAJA) came into operation to give effect to the Constitutional 
rights in s 33107
 
“This means that the Act makes the rights effective by providing 
an elaborated and detailed expression of the rights to just 
administrative actions and providing remedies to vindicate 
them.”108
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The rights numerated in s 33109 exist independently of the PAJA, 
which gives effect to the rights in s 33 and “retreats to a background 
role”110. 
 
6.1 Administrative Action 
The bail proceedings in terms of ss 59 and 59A of the Criminal 
Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (CPA) appear to be administrative 
proceedings111.  Sections 59 and 59A of the CPA allow the relevant 
official of the State to make a decision, which is of an administrative 
nature, in terms of the CPA that may adversely affect the right to 
bail112, freedom and security113 which would have a direct legal 
effect. 
 
This decision-making process falls within the definition of 
“administrative action”114 in s 1 of the PAJA and the decision making 
process in bail proceedings conducted by a prosecutor or police 
official is not specifically excluded by s 1(b)(aa)-(ii) of the PAJA. 
 
6.2 Just Administrative Action 
Section 33(1) reads “Everyone has the right to administrative action 
that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair”115.  This section 
provides for procedurally fair administrative action. 
 
Procedural fairness should at least include that persons affected by 
the decision making process be given a fair hearing and be heard 
(audi alteram partem) coupled with an impartial decision-making 
                                                     
109 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996. 
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1996. 
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1996. 
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private person when exercising a public power) 5. that adversely affects rights 6. 
that has direct external effect 7. that is not specifically excluded by the list of 
exclusion in subparas (aa) to (ii) of the definition of ‘administrative action’”. 





process (nemo index in sau causa)116.  These principles were once 
again confirmed by the Constitutional Court117. 
 
Section 3(1) of the PAJA echo’s these rights, stating “Administrative 
action, which materially and adversely affects the rights or legitimate 
expectation of any person must be procedurally fair.” 
 
One would expect that bail ought to be granted when a person is 
arrested for a fairly trivial offence such as shoplifting.  A person may 
also have a legitimate expectation to be released on bail in such 
circumstances.  The refusal to grant bail by the relevant official in 
terms of ss 59 and 59A will adversely affect the right to bail, freedom 
and security of a person. 
 
Section 3(1)(b) of the PAJA states,  
 
“In order to give effect to the right to procedurally fair 
administrative action, an administrator, subject to subsection (4), 
must give a person referred to in subsection (1)- 
 
(i) adequate notice of the nature and purpose of the 
proposed administrative action; 
(ii) a reasonable opportunity to make representations; 
(iii) a clear statement of the administrative action; 
(iv) adequate notice of any right to review or internal appeal, 
where applicable; and 
(v) adequate notice of the right to request reasons...” 
 
During the decision-making process, the police official in terms of s 
59 and prosecutor in terms of s 59A of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 
of 1977 has no obligation to entertain any representation on behalf of 
the accused118.  The opposing party (the State) presides over the bail 
proceedings and may make a decision without applying the audi 
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alteram partem rule.  This procedure is unconstitutional119 and 
procedurally unfair120. 
 
Sections 59 and 59A of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1997 do not 
prescribe the keeping of a proper record of proceedings121.  The 
prosecutor only has to keep a record “in respect of bail granted in 
terms of this section”122.  The indirect effect of the failure to keep a 
record is that an affected person cannot take the proceedings on 
review or appeal, which is contrary to the provisions of s 3(2)(b)(iv) of 
the PAJA as discussed above. 
 
The impugned sections of the CPA do not provide that reasons be 
given to the affected party123.  This failure is unconstitutional124 and 
does not adhere to the provisions of the PAJA125.   
 
Sections 59 and 59A thus appear to be inherently unconstitutional, 
however the issue may be resolved with the amendment to s 50(6)(b) 
of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 which prohibits an accused 
from approaching a court outside normal court hours.   
 
Once an administrative dispute as arisen, an accused will be allowed 
to apply to a Magistrate for bail. 
 
The limitation of s 33 of the Constitution126 may be justified by s 36 
of the Constitution127.  The aim of s 59 and 59A of the CPA is to 
enable arrested and detained persons to be released on bail at all 
hours prior to their first appearance in a lower court.  However, at 
this stage the limitation may be somewhat too extensive and should 
                                                     
119 Section 33(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 
1996. 
120 Sections 3(1) and 3(1)(b) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 
2000. 
121 J van der Berg Bail: A Practitioner’s Guide 2 ed (2001) at 33, T J Nell Borg 
handleiding (1987) at 8 
122 Section 59A(6) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
123 T H Nel Borg handleiding (1987) at 8. 
124 Section 33(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 
reads, “Everyone whose rights have been adversely affected by administrative action 
has the right to be given written reasons’. 
125 Section 3(2)(b)(iii) of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 2 of 2000. 






be amended to allow the accused or his legal representative an 
opportunity to be heard and to entitle the accused to request reasons 
for the decision of the person hearing the application.128
 




                                                     





7. ACCESS TO COURTS 
Section 34 of the Constitution 108 of 1996 reads: 
 
“Everyone has the right to have any dispute that can be 
resolved by the application of law decided in a fair public 
hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another 
independent and impartial tribunal or forum.” 
 
The provisions of s 59A of the CPA violate the rights in s 34 of the 
Constitution. 
 
Section 59A reads: 
 
“An attorney-general or a prosecutor… may, in respect of the 
offences referred to in schedule 7 and in consultation with the 
police official charged with the investigation, authorize the 
release of an accused on bail.” 
 
The issue of bail after arrest consists of two stages. 
 
The first stage is the period from arrest until the first appearance in a 
lower court.  This period is the “48-hour” period as referred to in s 50 
of the CPA.  As discussed before, the 48 hours may in practice be 
more than 80 hours. 
 
The second stage is from the first appearance in a lower court until 
the matter is finalised. 
 
This argument only pertains to the first stage.  Firstly it should be 
established whether the provisions of s 34 of the Constitution apply 
to bail applications.  
 
7.1 Application  
It may be argued that s 34 of the Constitution does not apply to bail 
applications as it forms part of criminal proceedings and falls outside 






It has been argued 129 that s 34 does not apply to criminal 
proceedings.  This argument is based firstly on the Constitutional 
Court’s decision of S v Pennington.130  The author’s interpretation of 
the judgement is 131 “criminal proceedings are not ordinarily referred 
to as ‘disputes’”. 
 
In addition to this, it is agued that s 35 of the Constitution, and not s 
34, is desired to protect the rights of an accused person during 
criminal proceedings.132
 
I partially disagree with the interpretation of the S v Pennington 
decision where Chaskalson P ruled: 
 
“The words ‘any dispute’ may be wide enough to include 
criminal proceedings, but it is not the way such proceedings 
are ordinarily referred to.  That s 34 has no application to 
criminal proceedings seems to me to follow not only from the 
language used but also from the fact that s 35 of the 
Constitution deals specifically with the manner in which 
criminal proceedings must be conducted.133” 
 
It is my interpretation of the judgement that s 34 does not exclude 
criminal proceedings per se. It is evident from the wording “wide 
enough to include” that there may very well be instances where 
criminal proceedings may fall within the framework of s 34 of the 
Constitution. 
 
Section 35 is specifically aimed at criminal proceedings and is 
designed to protect an accused person’s rights during a criminal trial.  
However it must be qualified in the same way that one would 
presume that such interpretation would only be acceptable with the 
                                                     
129 Ibid at 555. 
130 S v Pennington 1997(4) SA 1076 (CC). 
131 J de Waal, I Currie & G Erasmus Bill of Rights Handbook 4 ed (2001) at 555. 
132 Ibid. 





understanding that the presiding officer is a judicial officer as 
contemplated in s 165 of the Constitution Act 108 of 1996. 
 
When a bail application is brought at the first stage, the decision-
making is left to the Prosecutor.  It could not be argued that an 
arrested person’s rights will be protected by s 35 of the Constitution 
during after hour bail applications in terms of s 59A of the CPA. 
 
When it is accepted that bail application proceedings are criminal, it 
will fall within the ambit of s 34, and the accused person will be 
entitled to the protection afforded by this section. 
 
If the argument is that s 34 of the Constitution is only applicable to 
non-criminal proceedings, s 34 will still apply to bail proceedings. 
 
It has been argued that bail proceedings in terms of s 59 (police bail) 
and s 59A (bail by the Director of Public Prosecutions or an 
authorized Prosecutor) are administrative proceedings in nature134.   
 
The conclusion is that bail applications of s 59 and 59A of the CPA 
fall outside the definition of ‘criminal proceeding’ or for that matter 
judicial proceedings.135
 
I agree with the view that bail applications in this manner are not 
criminal proceedings, however am of the view that it is still a judicial 
proceeding. 
 
J Burchell defines criminal law as: 
“Criminal law is the branch of national law that defines certain 
forms of human conduct as crimes and provides for 
punishment of those persons with criminal capacity who 
unlawfully with a guilty mind commit a crime.”136
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Bail applications do not fall within the realm of criminal law.  Bail 
proceedings and bail are non-penal in character.137  The purpose of a 
bail application is not to establish whether the accused is guilty of an 
offence or not.138
 
In S v Mohammed139 the Appeal Court ruled: 
 
“It would seem at first glance that the proceedings are civil…the 
proceedings…are closely associated with the accused’s arrest, 
detention and prosecution for a criminal offence.  Hence, 
although they are civil in form, they are criminal in 
substance…” 
 
The proceedings conducted by a prosecutor in lieu of bail are not 
criminal.  The prosecutor fulfills an administrative action.  In 
addition, I would qualify the administrative action as an 
administrative action with a judicial character. 
 
In S v Nomzaza140 the Appeal Court ruled that there can be no doubt 
that bail applications are judicial proceedings.  This was reconfirmed 
by the Constitutional Court141. 
 
Bail proceedings in terms of s 59 and 59A are not criminal 
proceedings and thus a detainee entitled to have any dispute relating 
to his or her release by an application of law by an independent and 
impartial presiding officer.  Should the argument not be accepted, I 
will still argue that even if the proceedings are viewed as criminal, s 
34 will still apply for reasons argued above. 
 
7.1.1 Discretion of the Prosecutor 
In terms of s 59A of the CPA, a prosecutor may set bail after hours or 
outside the normal court hours.  The prosecutor may set bail if it is 
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deemed to be in the interest of justice that the accused not be 
detained further. 
 
However this discretion of the prosecutor entails more than just an 
enquiry to determine whether or not to set bail.  Bail may only be set 
outside court hours if the offence is one referred to in schedule 7 of 
the CPA. 
 
It would then mean that the prosecutor has to determine the 
schedule of the offence.  However, it is frequently difficult to 
determine the schedule of the offence. 
 
For example, a person is charged with the killing of another person 
and an application for bail is brought. 
 
Murder falls within the ambit of schedule 5 of the CPA.  The effect on 
bail application is that firstly the detainee is prohibited from being 
released from custody by a director of prosecutions or prosecutor.  
Secondly, the onus is now on the accused person to prove that his or 
her release is in the interest of justice.   
 
Section 60(11)(b), in schedule 5, reads: 
 
“…the court shall order that the accused be detained in 
custody until he or she is dealt with in accordance with the 
law, unless the accused, having been given a reasonable 
opportunity to do so adduces evidence which satisfies the court 
that the interests of justice permit his or her release.” 
 
Culpable Homicide falls within the ambit of schedule 7.  This means 
that the prosecutor has to decide on the culpability of the accused to 
determine whether bail may or may not be set.  During this process 
of decision-making, the prosecutor may only take into account the 
view of the State.  The prosecutor may also err on the side of caution 
in concluding that the offence is not a schedule 7 offence, leaving the 






Section 59A only allows for “consultation with the police official 
charged with the investigation.”  It has been argued that, where 
appropriate, the accused person should be given an opportunity to 
put his or her argument before the prosecutor when the issue of the 
schedule or bail is considered.  This would also adhere to the audi 
alteram partem rule.142  I fully agree with this view, however the 
provisions of s 59A of the CPA do not authorize such input from or 
consultation with the accused.  There is no duty on the prosecutor to 
hear the side of the accused or to consult with the legal 




When a bail application is heard in terms of s 59A of the CPA and 
bail is granted by the prosecutor, no dispute will arise and s 34 of the 
Constitution does not apply.  Section 34 will apply when bail is 
refused on the basis of a prosecutor’s ruling regarding the schedule of 
the offence, or due to the fact that the prosecutor deems it not to be 
in the interest of justice that the accused be released on bail.   
 
This can be illustrated by the following example: 
 
“A licence application to a government department will, for 
example, not trigger the protection of s 34.  This is because 
there is no legal dispute even if the officials who decide the 
application have a discretion and a hearing is held to decide on 
the application.  If, however, the licence is denied and the 
denial results in a dispute that can be resolved by the 
application of law, s 34 will become operational.”143
 
Once the prosecutor and the legal representative of the accused are 
in dispute over the schedule of the offence or whether the release of 
the accused is in the interest of justice, s 34 will become operative. 
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De Waal et al remind us that when any legislation is challenged, the 
objective remains to determine consistency with the Constitution.144
 
It is in line with the Constitution to grant bail wherever possible and 
an unfounded detention of an accused is in violation of s 12(1) of the 
Constitution which I have already discussed. 
 
The objective of section 35(1)(d) – (f) of the Constitution is also to 
release an accused person on bail as soon as reasonably possible if 
the interest of justice permits.  This I will discuss fully under the 
right to bail. 
 
Section 59 (police bail) of the CPA is in nature the same and does not 
need further discussion.  The arguments pertaining to s 59A of the 
CPA can apply mutatis mutandis to police bail. 
 
The crux of both sections is that s 34 of the Constitution will only 
come into operation once a dispute arises out of the discretion of the 
“presiding person” in the bail application.  If there is no dispute, bail 
will be granted and s 34 of the Constitution has no relevance. 
 
7.1.3 Tribunal or Forum 
Once the dispute arises, the effective person has the right to have the 
dispute resolved. 
 
Section 34 provides the right to have the dispute resolved by the 
application of law decided in a fair public hearing.145  The hearing 
may be before a court or where appropriate another independent or 
impartial tribunal or forum. 
 
As discussed above, bail applications are divided into schedules 
which once again deal with and regulate the onus during the bail 
proceedings. 
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The State bears the onus during sched 7 bail applications.  The onus 
would then be on the State to prove on a balance of probabilities that 
further detention of an accused person is in the interest of justice.  
Unfortunately the prosecutor also needs to hear the matter.  This 
position is unattainable, especially with the provisions of s 50 (6)(b) of 
the CPA which prohibits an  accused from approaching a magistrate 
outside normal court hours. 
 
This section violates the rights granted in terms of s 34 of the 
Constitution.  The section146 unequivocally states that an accused 
person “is not entitled to be brought to court outside normal court 
hours.” 
 
Section 50(6)(b) of the CPA should be amended in that it at least 
allows the accused person to have the disputes heard by an impartial 
tribunal or forum, but preferably a Magistrate’s Court in light of the 
fact that bail proceedings are judicial in character.147
 
In conclusion, I am of the view that s 59 and 59A of the CPA are not 
in violation of any rights in the Bill of Rights.  The violation is only 
triggered by s 59 and 59A of the CPA148. 
 
The real violation of s 34 of the Constitution in particular is caused 
by s 50(6)(b) of the CPA which prohibits the accused person from 
approaching a court to have the disputes resolved, whether on the 
schedule of the offence or if the release is in the interest of justice. 
 
The position before 1998 was the correct position of the law.  Once 
the State was of the view that bail should not be fixed, a court of law 
could have been approached.  The CPA should be amended to the 
position prior to 1998. 
 
~ * ~ 
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8. SECTION 35 – THE RIGHT TO BAIL 
The right to be granted bail has been entrenched into the final 
Constitution of South Africa149.  The Constitution acknowledges the 
rights granted to arrested, detained and accused persons under the 
old order150.  These rights stipulate that an accused person may be 
brought before a court as a matter of urgency and be released on bail 
if the interest of justice permits such a release. 
 
Section 35(1)151 reads: 
 
“Everyone who is arrested for allegedly committing an offence 
has the right – … 
(d) to be brought before a court as soon as reasonably 
possible, but not later than – 
(i) 48 hours after the arrest; or 
(ii) the end of the first court day after the 
expiring of the 48 hours, if the 48 hours expire outside 
ordinary court hours or on a day which is not an 
ordinary court day.” 
 
(e) at the first court appearance after being arrested, to be 
charged or to be informed of the reason for the detention to 
continue or to be released; and  
 
(f) to be released from detention if the interests of justice 
permit, subject to reasonable conditions.” 
 
Section 35(1)(d) entrenched the provisions of s 50(1)(c) and (1)(d) of 
the CPA.  Section 35(1)(e) entrenched s 50(6)(a) and s 35(1)(f) 
entrenched s 60(1)(a) of the CPA into the final Constitution.  Section 
35(1)(d) – (f) are in essence a repetition of ss 50(c), (d), 50(6)(a) and 
60(1)(a) of the CPA.  With the entrenching of these sections, it has 
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become part of the higher law of our country and part of the Bill of 
Rights in the Constitution. 
 
This also entrenched the rights granted to an accused person under 
the old order in the S v Twayie decision152. 
 
These sections entitle a person to bring a bail application as a matter 
of urgency and to be released on bail if justice permits. 
 
Section 35(1)(d) of the Constitution grants the accused person the 
right to bring an bail application as soon as reasonably possible.  
This means that a person is allowed to bring a bail application 
outside normal court hours.  Once accepted that the provisions of s 
50(1)(c) and 50(1)(d) of the CPA are entrenched into the Constitution, 
one should also accept that the jurisprudence pertaining to s 50(1)(c) 
and (1)(d) applies mutatis mutandis to s 35(1)(d). 153
 
This means that an accused person is entitled to be brought before 
court as soon as reasonably possible, even before the 48 hours have 
expired.  The jurisprudence on s 50(1)(c) and (1)(d) of the CPA grants 
the accused person the right to be brought before court with the help 
of the police and the Prosecutor as a matter of urgency154. 
 
It was common practice in criminal courts during the period 1986 to 
the 1st of August 1998 to bring bail applications after and outside 
normal court hours.  This practice did not change during the interim 
Constitution155.  Section 25(2)(d) granted the right “to be released 
from detention with or without bail, unless the interests of justice 
require otherwise.” 
 
The procedure to apply for bail after hours also continued during the 
final Constitution.  It must be accepted that the right to apply for bail 
outside normal court hours is well entrenched in our interim and 
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final constitution.  The jurisprudence, as discussed above, also 
acknowledged these rights that are now part of our Bill of Rights in 
the final constitution. 
 
Unfortunately these rights are now violated by the enactment of the 
Criminal Procedure Second Amendment Act 82 of 1997 which came 
into operation on the 1st of August 1988. 
 
8.1 Section 50(6)(b) of the CPA 
This section is probably the greatest intrusion into an accused person 
to bring a bail application on an urgent basis. 
 
This section states: An arrested person contemplated in para (a)(i) is 
not entitled to be brought to court outside ordinary court hours” 
 
This section prohibits the release of a person on bail even in 
instances where the State (police and Prosecutor) feels that it is in the 
interest of justice that the person should be released.  Once it is 
established that the likelihoods in s 60 (4), (9) and (10) of the CPA are 
all in favour of the accused, person, he or she should be released 
even if the offence falls outside the ambit of schedule 7 of the CPA.   
 
A practical example: 
A person gets arrested for theft of a motor vehicle on Wednesday 
afternoon at 17h00.  The person was not brought to court Thursday 
or Friday as the 48 hours only expires on Monday in terms of s 50 of 
the CPA.  Saturday morning the accused gets charged, he gives an 
explanation to the investigator.  This explanation can only be verified 
on Monday.  The value of the vehicle is R22 000.00. 
 
An application for bail is brought in terms of s 59A of the CPA.  The 
Prosecutor consults with the investigator and agrees that it is in the 






Unfortunately theft to the value of more than R20 000.00 is a 
schedule 1 offence and bail may only be set for offences of R20 
000.00 or less by the Prosecutor. 
Bail is therefore refused. 
 
On Monday morning, the investigator confirms the explanation given 
as true and the case gets withdrawn. 
 
Thus it appears that s 50 (6)(b) of the CPA violates the right of an 
accused person to bring an application as soon as reasonably 
possible.   
 
There is no basis or need for this section in our law and the 
enactment is without foundation.  There is no reason why a person 
should be detained if all parties are ad idem that the detainee’s 
release is in the interest of justice.   
 
This may also apply to sched 6 bail applications where the 
requirement is much higher156.   
 
The value of a person’s liberty in relation to s 50(6)(b) of the CPA has 
been questioned157.  Section 50(6)(b) does not value the right to bail.  
This single section has summarily removed the right to bail after 
normal court hours.  This section has also been criticized as a step 
backwards for the rights of detained persons158. 
 
Although legislature has acknowledged the right to bail after hours 
with the enactment of s 59A of the CPA, the application of this 
section is limited to only certain offences, thereby posing its own 
constitutional challenges which I have discussed elsewhere. 
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8.2 Section 50(6)(d) of the CPA 
At first glance, this section seems unable to violate the right to be 
released on bail. 
 
The provisions of this section were discussed above under chapter 
3.4.  I will therefore not repeat these. 
 
In a nutshell, the provisions entail that the State may request a 
remand at the first appearance of an accused person in terms of s 50 
of the CPA. 
 
The section grants the court the discretion to adjourn the bail 
proceedings for a period not exceeding seven days “on the terms the 
court may deem proper”.  Any postponements under s 50(6)(d) of the 
CPA are a matter of judicial discretion. 
 
However I have done research at the Magistrate’s Court in Cape Town 
over the period April 2005 – June 2005, and one hundred charge 
sheets from different courts were perused wherein the State 
requested a remand in terms of s 50(6) of the CPA. 
 
The section on which the State normally relies as a basis for the 
adjournment is s 50(6)(d)(i) of the CPA.  This section reads: 
 
“…the court is of the opinion that it has insufficient 
information or evidence at its disposal to reach a decision on 
the bail application.” 
 
When perusing the court records, it appears that the postponement is 
granted to the State merely on the basis that the State seeks a 
remand.  This also appears to be the case even in instances where 
the onus rests on the State to prove whether the further detention of 
the accused person is in the interest of justice. 
 
This argument can be illustrated by the following two examples of 






First Example - Case number 14/241/05
• Accused was arrested on 12 March 2005. 
• The accused was unrepresented on the 14th of March 2005, and 
appeared for the first time in the Magistrate’s Court. 
• The record of 14 March 2005, at first appearance, reads “S A 
versoek uitstel vir borginligting? (Prosecutor requests remand for 
bail information). 
• Second appearance on the 29th of March 2005; more than the 
allowed seven days in terms of s 50(6)(d). 
• On the 29th of March the record reads that the case was 
postponed for bail information. 
• The case was once again adjourned for seven days. 
• On the 1st of April 2005, the accused was represented.  The record 
then reads, “Bail granted”. 
 
During this bail application, no evidence was led, no certificate 
attached by the Director of Public Prosecutions that indicated the 
schedule of the offence and no formal charge sheet was completed. 
 
The application appears to be a schedule 7 or 1 offence in the light of 
the fact that the court did not require the defence to lead evidence. 
 
The accused was in custody for 21 days on request of the State and 
no information or evidence was requested by the court or given by the 
State to warrant an adjournment in terms of s 50(6) of the CPA.  The 
court also never granted the accused an opportunity to lead evidence 
to place “bail information” before the court. 
 
Second Example  
Cape Town Magistrate’s Court case number 25/420/05
• The accused appeared for the first time in a lower court on the 
22nd of April 2005. 
• The State requested a remand for “bail information”.   
• The record does not show the specific section of the CPA on which 





• The matter was adjourned (accused in custody) until the 29th of 
April 2005 after no information from the State was placed on 
record and no evidence led by either of the parties to the 
proceedings. 
 
It is not known whether this practice is common in the rest of South 
Africa.  However I have investigated the proceedings in other courts in 
the Western Cape such as Wynberg, Stellenbosh, Tulbagh, Atlantis, 
Simonstown and Bellville Magistrate’s Court and the practice appears 
to be the same. 
 
This practice has the ability to frustrate the right to bail as 
entrenched in s 35 of the Constitution.  The result is that bail 
applications are not dealt with as a matter of urgency and cases get 
remanded without an in-depth enquiry by the court in terms of s 
50(6)(d) of the CPA. 
 
The provisions of s 50(6)(d) of the CPA are not unconstitutional per 
se, but have the ability to violate the right to bail should the lower 
court not be more strict with remands in terms of this section. 
 






9. INTERPRETATION OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 
The Constitution Act 108 of 1996 is the highest law of the land.  The 
question that needs to be answered in relation to the Constitution is 
whether the impugned sections in the Criminal Procedures Second 
Amendment Act 85 of 1997 will pass Constitutional muster.  Neither 
the High Courts nor the Constitutional Court have ruled on the 
impugned sections.  These sections are s 50(6)(b) and (d) and s 59 
and 59A of the CPA. 
 
The Constitution commands that the interpretation be conducted in 
the ambit of s 39 of the Constitution which reads: 
 
“(1) When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or 
forum –  
(a) must promote the values that underlie an 
open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom; 
(b) must consider international law; and 
(c) may consider foreign law. 
 
(2) When interpreting any legislation, and when developing 
the common law or customary law, every court, tribunal 
or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of 
the Bill of Rights. 
 
(3) The Bill of Rights does not deny the existence of any other 
rights or freedoms that are recognized or conferred by 
common law, customary law or legislation, to the extent 
that they are consistent with the Bill.” 
  
9.1 The Values 
The Constitution Act 108 of 1996 entrenches the right to freedom and 
security of persons in s 12 and the right to bail in s 35(1)(f).  It also 
includes the right to be brought before a court as soon as reasonably 





application of law in a fair public hearing (section 33) before a court 
(section 34). 
 
Diametrically opposed to these rights in the Constitution, the CPA 
authorizes the release of a person on bail by a Magistrate’s court only 
on court days and in court hours.   
 
Section 50(6)(b) of the CPA prohibits an accused from being brought 
before a court and allows the State the opportunity to usurp the 
court’s judicial function in terms of s 59 and 59A of the CPA to 
adjudicate over bail applications outside of normal court hours.   
 
Will Sections 50(6)(b) and (d), as well as s 59A of the CPA promote the 
values of an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom? 
 
These sections of the CPA will not pass the constitutional muster 
should the Constitutional Court rule on the provisions in the future.  
The task of the Constitutional Court is to give effect to the values of 
the Constitution159.   
 
It is not the Constitutional Court’s function to search for the 
intention of the Constitutional Assembly160. 
 
The writer suggests161 that one should, as a starting point, look at 
the language and the structure of the text itself.  For this discussion I 
will not repeat it as these rights have already been fully discussed 
under chapter 4.2.   
 
Then one must also investigate the historical context of the rights162. 
In chapter one of this dissertation, I discussed at length the history of 
the right to bail.  However it is important to remind oneself that 
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notwithstanding the view of the High Courts, the legislature will enact 
statutes that violate rights granted by the courts.   
 
As discussed, the Supreme Courts (High Court) in the apartheid 
years ruled that a person is entitled to bail, and that applications 
may be heard on an urgent basis163.  
 
Juxtaposed to the view of the Supreme Court, legislation exists that 
violated the crux of these rights granted by the Supreme Court. 
 
An example of this legislation is s 29(6) of the Internal Security Act 74 
of 1982, which reads: 
 
“No court of law shall have jurisdiction to pronounce upon the 
validity of any action taken in terms of this section, or to order 
the release of any person detained in terms of this section.” 
 
Section 61 of the CPA (repealed by s 4 of Act 75 of 1995) reads: 
 
“(1) If an accused who is in custody in respect of any offence 
referred to in part III of Schedule 2 applies under section 60 
to be released on bail in respect of such offence, and the 
attorney-general, either by written notice or in person, 
informs the court before which the accused applies for bail 
that information is available to him - 
 
(a) which, in his opinion, cannot be disclosed without 
prejudice to the public interest or the administration of 
justice; and 
 
(b) which, in his opinion, shows that the release of the 
accused on bail is likely to affect the administration of 
justice adversely or to constitute a threat to the safety of 
the public or the maintenance of the public order; 
 
                                                     





and that he on the ground of the likelihood of such 
adverse effect or of such threat objects to the granting of 
bail to the accused, the court shall refuse the application 
for bail.” 
 
These two examples indicate the history of the violation to the right to 
bail that has been more than a century old.  This is also the history 
of our country.  Although the Supreme Courts and the Appeal Court 
(as it was then known)164 attempted to guard against the violation or 
a person’s freedom, security and right to bail, the apartheid 
government circumnavigated this with ouster clauses and were very 
often used in security legislation.   
 
Now the Bill of Rights entrenches the right to bail, in addition to 
which it also entrenched the right to be brought before a court as 
soon as reasonably possible165. 
 
Section 50(6)(b) of the CPA must be seen as a violation of the right to 
bail coupled with the right to have the application heard as soon as 
reasonably possible by a court of law.  This section reminds one of 
the ouster clauses found in security legislation.  The meaning of this 
section is actually that no court of law shall have the jurisdiction to 
order the release of any person detained for any offence outside 
ordinary court hours. 
 
Thirdly, the writer advises that one should investigate the common 
law166 “as part of the historical context in which the Bill of Rights is 
situated”.  This will be an important source of interpretation. 
 
In this instance it is important to note the specific wording of s 50 of 
the CPA.  Section 50(1)(c) of the CPA reads: 
 
                                                     
164 Minister van Wet en Orde en ‘n ander v Dipper 1993 (2) SACR 221 (A). 
165 Section 35(1)(f) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 
1996. 
166 N Steytler Constitutional Criminal Procedure: A Commentary on the Constitution of 





“…he or she shall be brought before a lower court as soon as 
reasonably possible but not later than 48 hours after the 
arrest.” 
 
Section 35(1) of the Constitution reads: 
 
“Everyone who is arrested…(d) to be brought before a court as 
soon as reasonably possible, but not later than – (i) 48 hours 
after the arrest.” 
 
The common law is summarized in Dipper’s Case by Hoexter AJ 
who held: 
 
“An accused, who is in custody, is entitled to make application 
for his release on bail before the expiry of the 48 hours referred 
to in s 50(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, that is 
before his compulsory first appearance in a lower court in 
terms of s 50(1).”167
 
The expression “at his first appearance in a lower court” in s 60 of the 
Act does not only refer to the first compulsory appearance in terms of 
s 50(1) but also includes a first appearance at the accused’s own 
request168. 
 
Our history pre the Constitution indicates that certain legislation 
violates South Africans’ rights to freedom, security and to be released 
on bail.  The Constitution acknowledges these violations, hence the 
entrenchment of the rights to freedom, security and protection of 
rights by the courts. 
 
                                                     






9.2 International Law 
Section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution prescribes that a court, tribunal 
or forum must consider international law when the Bill of Rights is 
interpreted. 
 
International law in the form of international agreements and 
customary international law may be used as a yardstick and 
framework to evaluate and to understand our Bill of Rights169. 
 
The Court or other forum that uses international law as an 
instrument of interpretation is not necessarily bound by the law, 
however it must consider it in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights.  
Lang J in S v Williams said, “we are not bound to follow it but neither 
can we ignore it.”170
 
The international law on the right to bail is clear, but silent on the 
right to bring a bail application outside normal hours. It is however 
open for interpretation to allow the inclusion of a right to bail before 
the first appearance in a criminal court. 
 
Section 9(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (1996) reads: 
 
“…It shall not be the general rule that persons awaiting trial 
shall be detained in custody, but release may be subject to 
guarantees to appear for trial, at any other stage of the judicial 
proceeding…” 
 
The phrase “at any other stage of the judicial proceeding” could be 
interpreted as the stage before the first appearance in a court of law. 
 
Article 37(b) of the Constitution on the Rights of the Child deals with 
the arrest and detention of a child and prescribes that arrest and 
detention of a child should only be the last resort.  The section states 
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further that the detention should be “for the shortest appropriate 
period of time.” 
 
Article 5(3) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms states that an accused who 
appears before a court: 
 
“…shall be entitled to bail within a reasonable time or 
to release pending trial.  Release may be conditional 
by guarantees to appear for trial.” 
 
This section was interpreted by the Court in B v Austria171 and the 
ruling was that article 5(3) applies from the very moment of arrest.  
 
The international instrument allows for bail immediately after arrest.  
A person should not be incarcerated unnecessarily or without just 
cause. 
 
Article 7(5) of the American Convention on Human Rights is worded 
to the same effect as the sections discussed above and allows the 
release of an accused on providing guarantees to secure court 
attendance. 
 
The argument for the release of a detainee is evidently stronger than 
the unwarranted detention.  A person should be released from 
custody as soon as reasonably possible if justice permits the release. 
 
9.3 Foreign Law 
When a court interprets the Bill of Rights, the court may consider 
foreign law172.  The courts have to have regard for foreign law 
however Chaskelson P in S v Makwanyane states “there is no 
injunction to do more than this.”   
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The argument by certain writers is that one should first examine the 
text and context of the law of the country to which it is compared173.  
The structural differences will determine whether the comparison is 
relevant or irrelevant.  Secondly174, he suggests that “the underlying 
rationale and concept or doctrine should be identified.”  Lastly175, one 
should consider the consequences of applying the foreign law in our 
context of South African Law. 
 
Our courts have in the past considered foreign law when interpreting 
our Bill of Rights.  Our courts have however investigated and cited 
some countries’ jurisprudence more than others.  The Canadian 
Charter has greatly influenced the drafting of our Bill of Rights and 
hence our Courts have investigated the legal position in Canada176.  
Our courts have made reference to other jurisprudence of other 
countries, however it appears that our courts predominantly cite law 
of the Commonwealth and countries such as the United State, 
Canada and Namibia177. 
 
I will thus concentrate on these three countries when I investigate the 
right to bail and more particularly the right to have a bail application 
heard outside normal court hours and as a matter of urgency. 
 
9.3(a) Namibia 
Namibia’s jurisprudence on the interpretation of the Bill of Rights can 
be used as an important instrument when one considers the 
provision of our Bill of Rights and CPA.  The text of the Bill of Rights 
is very similar to ours and the Criminal Procedures Act 51 of 1977 of 
South Africa is still in force in Namibia.  The reason for this 
phenomenon is before Namibia became independent in 1989, it was 
governed by South Africa178. 
 
Section 11 of the Namibian Constitution of 1990 provides: 
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“(1) No person shall be subject to arbitrary arrest or detention… 
 
(3) All persons who are arrested and detained in custody shall 
be brought before the nearest magistrate or other judicial 
within a period of forty-eight (48) hours of their arrest or, if this 
is not possible, as soon as possible thereafter….” 
 
Sections 50(1), 59 and 60 of the CPA of Namibia regulate bail 
proceedings.  For this discussion I will not repeat these sections as 
the content is similar to the CPA in South Africa and has been 
discussed in detail in stages one and two of my discussion. 
 
In the High Court decision of Grace v Fouche and Others179, the court 
had to decide whether a person arrested and detained had the right 
to apply for bail within the 48 hours after the arrest; also whether 
such a right includes the right to apply for bail outside normal court 
hours. 
 
Hannah J ruled that the Constitution of Namibia allows a person to 




“Article 11(3) does not, in my view, confer a right on the State 
to detain a person in custody for 48 hours at its whim if it is 
reasonably practical to bring that person before a magistrate at 
an earlier point in time.” 
 
In addition to the above, the court ruled that s 50(1) of the CPA “must 
be read in the light of the foregoing.”181
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In his ratio decidendi, Hannah J emphasized the importance of a 
person’s liberty their consequent entitlement to apply for bail on his 
or her own initiative outside normal court hours. 
 
The court relied on the South African decision of S v Twayie182 and 
endorsed the decision of Kotze J. 
 
It is further important to note that Hannah J found that the 
applications for bail may be brought without the presence of the 
prosecutor as long as the Investigating Officer attends the 
proceedings and will testify183. 
 
The court however notes that the right is qualified to bail application 
where grounds for urgency exist, “For example when an arrested 
person is found to suffer from some chronic medical ailment…”184  
This does not preclude the accused from bringing the matter before a 
magistrate as the magistrate must still apply his or her mind on a 
case by case basis185.   
 
I fully agree with the interpretation of the Constitution and the CPA 
by the Namibian High Court.  This illustrates the right to liberty and 
the right to have bail proceedings conducted by a court of law.  I do 
not agree with the requirement that the applicant must show real 
grounds that urgency exists as all bail applications are deemed to be 
urgent as a person’s liberty is at stake186. 
 
9.3(b) Canada 
The Canadian Bill of Rights 1960, C 44 reads: 
 
“…no law of Canada shall be construed or applied so as to… 
 
(f) deprive a person charged with a criminal offence of the 
right…to reasonable bail without just cause…” 
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The Criminal Code of 1985 regulates the criminal proceedings in 
Canada.  Section 503(1) of this Code prescribes the bail proceedings 
when a person is arrested with or without a warrant of arrest.  
Section 503(1) states: 
 
“A peace officer who arrests a person… shall cause the person 
to be detained… and, to be taken before a justice to be dealt 
with according to law. 
 
(a) …within a period of twenty four hours after the person 
has been arrested.” 
 
When comparing the Canadian law and jurisprudence to that of 
South Africa, we are warned that “the two societies are very 
different.”187  On the other hand, it is also said that Canada is an 
excellent example of a true democracy188. 
 
The most important difference, in my opinion, between South African 
law and Canadian Criminal Procedure pertaining to the right to bail 
after court hours is the fact that the 24 hour period contemplated in 
s 503 means 24 hours and includes the time that a person is 
incarcerated during non court hours.  The result is an automatic 
right to bail over weekends and outside court hours. 
 
In the event of a justice not being available to hear the application, 
the accused has to be brought before a justice as soon as possible or 
if the time expires, must be released by the Peace Officer189. 
 
This is a confirmation that the Canadian law acknowledges the right 
to bail coupled with the right to be heard by a judicial officer on an 
urgent basis. 
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The Constitutional Court of Canada has stated that bail legislation 
should be interpreted in a liberal manner190. 
 
I agree with this view and believe in the event of the Constitutional 
Court’s interpretation of the constitutionality of s 50(6)(b) of the CPA, 
our Constitutional Court will find this section to be a violation of the 
right to bail in terms of s 35(1)(f) of the Constitution.  
 
9.3(c) United States of America 
The right to bail in America may be drawn from various parts of the 
American Constitution.   
 
The fourteenth Amendment of the Rights of the People of America 
states: 
 
“Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law.” 
 
According to other authors191, the right to be bail may be read “into 
the prohibition contained in the Eighth Amendment against excessive 
bail”.   
 
In the decision of the United States v Salemo192 the court ruled 
differently and found that the merits to grant bail flow from the due 
process clause of the Fifth Amendment and not from the “excessive 
bail provision” of the Eight Amendment. 
 
Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of the Criminal Procedure deals with 
appearances of an accused after arrest.  Rule 5(1)(1)(A) reads: 
 
“A person making an arrest within the United States must take 
the defendant without unnecessary delay before a magistrate, 
judge or before State or local judicial officer…” 
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This procedure allows a person to apply for bail when he or she 
appears before the judicial officer. 
 
The rule does not allow the police to detain a person for a period of 
time before the accused’s first appearance in court.  The accused 
(defendant) must be taken without delay to appear before a magistrate 
or judge. 
 
This rule also allows an accused to be released at any hour of the day 
and on weekends193.  The courts are obliged to keep a schedule 
indicating the judge, and clerk who is responsible to deal with the bail 
applications194. 
 
Clerks are instructed to accept telephone calls from attorneys and 
prosecutors after hours and in some instances are also allowed to set 
bail195. 
 
The above practice indicates that the right to apply for bail after 
hours in the USA, especially in Vermont, is a well respected right of 
an accused.   
 
9.4 The Common Law or Customary Law 
Section 39(2) of the Constitution commands that courts and 
tribunals must promote the spirit and the objectives of the Bill of 
Rights when interpreting legislation and when developing the 
common law or customary law. 
 
The common law of our country acknowledges the right to bring a 
bail application outside normal court hours and before the 48 hour 
rule expires in terms of s 50(1) lf the CPA196.  The common law also 
provides that an accused is entitled, on his own initiative, to appear 
before a court of law to apply for bail197. 
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Section 39 (2) of the 1996 Constitution creates a framework for the 
harmonization of legislation of parliament with the Constitution198.   
 
Certain rights were granted to arrested and detained persons pre-
constitution and the courts must have regard for these principles of 
law199.   
 
The court is not bound by the common law principles200, however the 
court must consider the common law precedent201. 
Section 35(3) of the interim Constitution provided that a “court shall 
have due regard to the spirit, purport and objects of this chapter.” 
 
Section 39(2) of the final Constitution provides that “a court must 
promote the spirit…” 
 
In S v Letaoana, Marcus AJ stated202: 
 
“To ‘promote’ in this context, means to further or advance.  It 
means more than taking into account.” 
 
The court ruled further that when one interprets the provisions of s 
60 of the CPA (bail provisions), the court would be “obliged to 
‘promote’ the objects of the Bill of Rights.” 203
 
The court also stated that a court may reconsider decisions 
“including those of the Appellate Division handed down before the 
Constitution came into operation”.204
 
However I will argue that in the event of the Constitutional 
interpretation of s 50(6)(b) of the CPA, the court will find that this 
section is unconstitutional.  The correct legal position in relation to 
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the right to bail after hours is the provision as set out in Dipper’s 
case205. 
 
The ratio decidendi in this decision promotes the spirit, purport and 
objects of the Bill of Rights as set out in s 35(1)(d) – (f) of the 
Constitution.  The right to apply for bail after hours is consistent with 
the provisions of s 35(1)(d) and of the Constitution. 
Section 39(3) states: 
 
“The Bill of Rights does not deny the existence of any other 
rights of freedoms that are recognized or conferred by common 
law, …, to the extent that they are consistent with the Bill.” 
 
The impugned legislation does not promote the spirit and the 
objectives of the Bill of Rights.  
 
Section 50(6)(b) of the CPA prohibits an accused from applying for 
bail outside normal court hours.  Bail applications are currently 
heard after hours by the prosecutor in terms of s 59A of the CPA and 
not by judicial officers.  These sections should be amended to 
harmonise it with the Constitution.   
 
I am however of the view that s 50(6)(b) should be declared as 
unconstitutional as it is not capable of being harmonized with the Bill 
of Rights.  Section 59A needs no amendment in the event of s 50(6)(b) 
of the CPA being declared unconstitutional. This would mean that an 
accused may approach a court if any dispute arises in terms of s 59A 
of the CPA. 
 
~ * ~ 
                                                     






10. LIMITATION OF RIGHTS 
Constitutional law authors are in agreement that fundamental rights 
and freedoms are not absolute206.  This also pertains to the right to 
bail and all states recognise this limitation and the need for the 
curtailment of the right to liberty, especially in the criminal procedure 
context207.  There may be valid reasons for the arrest and detention of 
awaiting trial prisoners. 
 
In South Africa, the rights in the Bill of Rights are limited by s 36 of 
the Constitution which reads: 
 
“(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only terms of 
law of general application to the extent that the limitation is 
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, 
taking into account all relevant factors, including – 
 
(a) the nature of the right; 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; 
and 
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
 
(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other 
provision of the Constitution, no law may limit any right 
entrenched in the Bill of Rights.” 
 
The contents of s 36 of the Constitution confirm that rights in the Bill 
of Rights may be limited.  Section 36 acknowledges justifiable and 
unjustifiable infringements of entrenched rights.  The infringements 
will be justifiable and constitutional infringements only when the 
rights in the Bill of Rights are limited by a law of general application.   
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Further, it must be justifiable in an open and democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom, coupled with all the 
other relevant factors as enumerated in s 36 of the Constitution. 
 
10.1 Law of General Application 
The Constitution allows the limitations only by law of general 
applications. 
 
O’Regan J states that a law of general application, “be stated in a 
clear and accessible manner.”208
 
It has been argued that a law of general application should, at the 
minimum, be applicable to everyone and not be applied arbitrarily209.   
 
The Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 is a law of general application.  
Sections 39 – 49 of the CPA authorize and prescribe when, by whom 
and how an arrest may be effected. 
 
This law of general application limits the rights of freedom and 
security of a person in terms of s 12 of the Constitution. 
 
It is in the interests of justice that wrongdoers be brought before 
court and, if guilty, be punished for the offence committed.  The State 
also has a duty to protect its law abiding citizens and to preserve our 
“criminal justice system’s effectiveness as a deterrent to crime”210. 
 
The right to bail in the Constitution is also limited.  Section 35(1)(f) of 
the Constitution limits the right to bail in the wording of this section 
reads, “to be released from detention if the interests of justice 
permit.” 
 
Section 60 of the CPA has similar wording as s 35(1)(f) of the 
Constitution and also limits the right. 
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The arrest and detention of a person are proper when reasonable 
grounds exist to believe that a crime was committed by that person.  
However, I disagree with the argument that the minimum time of 
detention before a first appearance before a court for a bail 
application should be regulated by statute. 
 
I am of the view that s 50(6)(b) of the CPA violates the right to apply 
to a court of law for bail, and results in a violation of s 35(1)(f) of the 
Constitution.  It also violates the right to have access to courts in 
terms of s 34 of the Constitution. 
 
It is my opinion that s 50(6)(b) of the CPA will not pass the 
constitutional muster.  The factors as mentioned in s 36(1)(a) – (e) 
favour the right to apply for bail as soon as reasonably possible. 
 
10.2 Relevant Factors 
I will highlight below the factors most relevant to the limitations on 
the right to freedom and indeed the right itself, namely: 
 (a) The nature of the right; 
 (b) The importance of the purpose of the limitations; 
 (c) The nature and extent of the limitations ; 
 (d) The relation between the limitation and its purpose and 
 (e) Less restrictive means to achieve the purpose 
 
10.2(a) The nature of the right 
The right to freedom is one of the cornerstone rights of democracy in 
South Africa.   
 
Section 7 states211: 
 
“7. (1) This Bill of Rights is a cornerstone of democracy 
in South Africa.  It enshrines the rights of all people on our 
country and affirms the democratic values of human 
dignity, equality and freedom. 
 
                                                     





(2) The State must respect, protect, promote and fulfill 
the rights in the Bill of Rights.” 
 
In S v Makwanyane212, the Constitutional Court considered the 
nature of rights and viewed the right to live and dignity as the two 
most important rights antecedent to all other rights in the 
Constitution. 
 
Chaskalson P also mentioned that “dignity is inevitably impaired by 
imprisonment.”213
 
The rights mentioned in s 7 of the Constitution are the most 
important rights and weigh more heavily than other rights, the result 
of which is that an infringement on these rights may not be as 
justified whereas it may be, in the instance, of less important 
rights214.  
 
10.2(b) The importance of the purpose of the limitation 
It is important that guilty people be brought to book.  It may also, in 
certain circumstances, necessitate a person’s arrest. 
 
When a person is arrested for a schedule 1 offence, and it has been 
established that he will stand his trial, should that person be 
detained further? 
 
Conradie J ruled: “It could not have been the intention of the 
legislature that an alleged offender must be detained when he has 
established conclusively that he will stand his trial, that he will not 
interfere with the administration of justice and that he will commit no 
further wrongdoing.  As soon as more is required of him, the 
procedure becomes punitive.”215
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The importance of detention after arrest will become less after the 
purpose for the arrest is satisfied.  It would be unreasonable to detain 
a person as it would serve no further purpose. 
 
It has been argued that “A limitation of rights that serves a purpose 
that does not contribute to an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom cannot therefore be 
justifiable.”216
 
There is absolutely no purpose in detaining a person when the 
requirements for the release on bail in terms of s 60 of the CPA have 
been met, notwithstanding the schedule of the offence. 
 
Arguments for the detention of arrested persons for longer periods 
may exist.  These arguments would probably be based on the 
lawlessness and the current climate of violent crime in South Africa.  
It has been argued that the government is forced to strike a balance 
between crime and human rights217.  The result is that the 
government implemented anti-crime measures notwithstanding the 
opposition from human rights groups.  “The starkest case is the 1998 
legislative amendment of the bail law, which makes it all but 
impossible for those charged with certain violent crimes to get 
bail.”218 However, I cannot agree with this argument as the 
unnecessary detention of arrested persons aimed at curbing crime 
would serve no purpose. 
 
The State should concentrate more on achieving successful 
prosecutions than wasting valuable resources and court time on 
opposing bail applications with no merit.219
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10.2(c) The nature and extent of the limitations 
While I agree that the limitation on an accused’s right to freedom 
imposed by his or her arrest is, by its very definition, mandatory, this 
limitation should be temporary.     
 
The limitation on an accused’s rights, particularly the right to 
freedom, should do no more damage to these rights than is essential 
in achieving the purpose of the limitation.   
 
Once the detention of the accused person has served its purpose to 
ascertain the assurance of the accused not to endanger the 
community, interfere with the investigation in any way, conceal or 
destroy evidence, intimidate witnesses nor evade his or her trial, 
freedom of the accused person, pending the guarantee of appearance 
in court as required, should be restored. 
 
10.2(d) The relation between the limitation and its purpose 
The purpose of the limitation imposed through the detention of an 
accused person should, simply put, be to ensure his or her 
appearance at further court appearances with regard to the alleged 
crime, in the interests of justice. 
 
There is no rationale behind a limitation being enforced – and a right 
being violated - for the sole purpose of upholding a statute.  The 
essence of the balance between the purpose to be achieved and the 
limitation imposed is encapsulated by this view: 
 
“Logically, this requires there to be a casual connection 
between the law and its purpose: the law must tend to serve 
the purpose that it is designed to serve.  If the law does not 
serve the purpose it is designed to serve at all it cannot be a 
reasonable limitation of the right.” 220
 
                                                     






10.2(e) Less restrictive means to achieve the purpose 
To achieve the purpose of serving the ends of justice, an accused 
person is required to attend court for his or her alleged crime.  To 
ensure that this is achieved, the accused person should be detained, 
questioned and released. 
 
In my opinion there is very little motive for prolonging the custodial 
period once the purpose of limiting the right of the accused person to 
his or her freedom has been met. 
 
Should the possibility exist that the accused person can, in any way, 
assure a court of his or her future attendance at court proceedings 
without being detained, the accused should be released.  Less 
restrictive means are to summons an accused to court if possible and 
in the event of arrest and detention to release a person on bail 
pending the outcome of the criminal trial. 
 
It must also be said that there may be instances where the release of 
a person may not be in the interests of justice.  In those instances it 
would be constitutional to detain a person.  The most common 
reason for detention is where bail was granted before and the person 
had evaded his or her trial. 
 





11. REMEDIES FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL 
VIOLATION 
When it is established that s 50(6)(b) and (d) or s 59 and 59A of the 
CPA constitute an unjustifiable infringement of one or more 
constitutional rights, the claimant is entitled to a remedy. 
 
In terms of s 172 of the Constitution, a court finds the law 
inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution, a court must 
declare it invalid to the extent of its inconsistency221. 
 
The court also has the discretion to grant an order which is “just an 
equitable” in the circumstances. 
 
~ * ~ 
                                                     







It is evident from the discussion above that our High Courts222 and 
Constitution223 acknowledge the right to bail.  The CPA also allows 
the release of an accused on bail outside normal court hours and 
before her first appearance in a lower court224.   
 
Both these sections acknowledge and give effect to the Constitutional 
right of an accused to be released on bail as soon as reasonably 
possible, even outside normal court hours225.  Extra curial bail 
applications are however limited to certain less serious offences226.   
 
In the instance of an accused being charged with a more serious 
offence, s 50(6)(b) of the CPA227 suspends her Constitutional right to 
apply for bail until her first appearance in a lower court.  This section 
is a direct violation of an accused’s right to be released on bail as 
soon as reasonably possible and should not be saved by the 
limitation clause in the Constitution.228
 
Neither the High Court nor the Constitutional Court has yet ruled on 
the constitutionality of s 50(6)(b) of the CPA.  I am of the view that 
should this provision be tested against the rights in the Constitution, 
it may not pass the constitutional muster.   
 
In the event of the Constitutional Court declaring this section as 
being unconstitutional, the violation of the rights of the accused 
would be eliminated, as the accused would then be permitted to 
apply for bail outside court hours and on non court days, even before 
the expiry of the 48 hours in terms of s 50(1) the CPA. 
 
                                                     
222 Twayie v Minister van Justisie 1986 (2) SA 101 (O); S v Du Preez 1991 (2) SACR 
372 (Ck); Minister van Wet en Order v Dipper 1993 (2) SASV 221 (A). 
223 Section 35(1)(f) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 
1996. 
224 Section 59 and 59A of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
225 Section 35(1)(d) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 
1996. 
226 See discussion in ch 3 above. 
227 Section 50(6)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 states “An arrested 
person… is not entitled to be brought to court outside ordinary court hours.” 
228 Section 36 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 





However, one should seek a more attainable solution to this violation 
of the right of an accused to bail.   
 
History has taught us that notwithstanding the right to apply for bail 
outside court hours, this right was violated by deliberate actions on 
the part of the police229. 
 
The Canadian Criminal Code may offer a solution to the situation 
specific to South Africa230.  Section 50(1)(c) of the CPA should be 
amended regarding the maximum time of detention before the 
appearance of an accused in a lower court from 48 to 24 hours.  The 
24 hours period should be calculated with the inclusion of public 
holidays and non court days. 
 
The State will not be prejudiced by this procedure as they will still be 
entitled to request a remand in terms of s 50(6)(d)(i)-(v) of the CPA in 
the event of more information being needed in establishing whether 
bail should be opposed or not. 
 
This procedure would also grant the court an opportunity to 
investigate the further detention of an accused in terms of s 60(2) and 
60(3) of the CPA.  Further detention would then only be permissible 
once a court, rather than the police, had found it to be justified.   
 
This may however mean that courts would have to convene on 
Saturdays, Sundays and public holidays to hear bail applications.   
 
This would still be more cost effective than the pre-1 August 1998 
position wherein courts convened on a daily basis outside of normal 
court hours and at all hours of day and night.   
 
                                                     
229 S v Du Preez 1991 (2) SACR 372 (Ck); Novick v Minister of Law and Order 1993 
(1) SACR 194 (W). 
230 Section 503(1) of the Criminal Code of 1985 states “A peace offer who arrests a 
person… shall cause the person to be detained… and, to be taken before a justice 
to be dealt with according to law (a) … within a period of twenty four hours after the 





The protraction of the time spent within the twenty four hours will be 
justified and not excessive; the constitutional right of an accused to 
be released on bail as soon as reasonably possible will therefore not 
be infringed. 
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